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IN RECENT  YEARS,  THE SHRINKING  U.S.  trade  balance  has drawn  a good 
deal  of attention  and  caused  some  concern  here  and  abroad.  The  balance  on 
merchandise  trade  reached  a peak of $6.8 billion  in 1964,  and  then shrank 
to about  $650  million  in 1968  and 1969.  This  reduction  was  due  to some  ex- 
tent  to the excess  demand  in the United  States  in 1966-68,  and  the ensuing 
inflation.  But, as some observers  have pointed  out, the inflationary  boom 
could  explain  only  part  of the story.'  They  suggested  that  the deterioration 
was the result  mainly  of longer-term  trends  in the basic  U.S. competitive 
position.  This  view  has gained  more  prominence  as the increase  in the U.S. 
trade  surplus  to $2.1  billion  in 1970  was  followed  by a deficit  in the first  half 
of 1971  despite  the slowdown  in domestic  economic  activity.  Thus,  the re- 
cession  has  not been  accompanied  by an  improvement  in the trade  balance, 
* We wish to thank Betty L. Barker, Barbara  R.  Lowrey, Kathryn A.  Morisse, 
Nicholas Monoyios, and, especially,  Raymond D. Hill for assistance.  Besides  acknowl- 
edging  assistance  from the Brookings  panel, we are also indebted  to Benjamin  J. Cohen, 
Keith L. R. Pavitt,  and staff  members  of the Board  of Governors  of the Federal  Reserve 
System  for comments  on an earlier  draft.  The views expressed  in this paper  are those of 
the authors,  and do not necessarily  reflect  those of the Board of Governors. 
1. See,  for example, Michael Boretsky, "Concerns about the Present American 
Position  in International  Trade"  (paper  presented  at the National Academy  of Engineer- 
ing  Symposium on  Technology and  International Trade, October 14-15,  1970; 
processed). 
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mainly  because  imports  have  continued  to rise  well  beyond  their  usual  rela- 
tion to the growth  in gross  national  product  (GNP). 
In an attempt  to illuminate  some  of the uncertainties  concerning  the U.S. 
trade  position  this paper  presents  an analytical  description  of U.S. trade  in 
manufactured  goods,  drawing  on our  ongoing  research  into these  topics.  It 
is organized  around  three  questions:  What  have  been  the long-term  trends 
in U.S. trade  by commodity  groups?  How has the U.S. trade  performance 
in the 1960s  compared  with  that of other  major  industrial  countries?  What 
is the source  of current  U.S. comparative  advantage  in trade? 
The first  section draws  on the trade  data broken  down by the end-use 
categories  employed  by the Office  of Business  Economics  (OBE)  to review 
trends  in U.S. trade  from 1925  to 1970,  by seven  major  end-use  aggregates. 
The second extends  the analysis  of the U.S. aggregates,  drawing  on the 
data published  by the Organisation  for Economic  Co-operation  and De- 
velopment  (OECD)  on trade  among  the major  industrialized  countries  and 
on national  GNP data  in order  to compare  U.S. output,  demand,  and  trade 
by major  end-use  categories  with  those of other  industrial  countries  in the 
1960s.  The third  section  turns  to disaggregated  data on trade  in manufac- 
tured  goods,  reviewing  trends  in disaggregated  OBE  end-use  groups  to ob- 
serve  patterns  in trade  at the three-  and four-digit  level. The final section 
studies  the source  of U.S. comparative  advantage  in a cross-section  of U.S. 
trade by two- and three-digit  standard  international  trade classification 
(SITC)  categories; 
Long-term  Trends  in U.S. Trade  by End-use  Categories 
A useful  perspective  on developments  in U.S. trade  can be obtained  by 
reviewing  its longer-run  trends  by end-use  commodity  categories.  The OBE 
data  on trade  are  broken  down  under  five  summary  categories:  foods,  feeds, 
and beverages  (0); industrial  supplies  and materials  (1); capital  goods (2); 
automotive  products  (3); and consumer  goods  (4).2  This section  considers 
these  aggregate  end-use  categories.  Selected  three-  and  four-digit  categories 
are examined  below to observe  more detailed  movements  in trade. 
2. U.S. Department  of Commerce,  Office  of Business  Economics, U.S. Exports  and 
Imports  Classified  by OBE End-  Use Commodity  Categories,  1923-1968,  A Supplement  to 
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INITIAL  ASSUMPTIONS  AND  HYPOTHESES 
Two basic questions  arise  in analyzing  and presenting  the OBE data: 
How should  the data  be disaggregated-in  terms  of both categories  to be 
used  and  degree  of detail?  And how should  exports  and imports  be related 
to each  other? 
To a large  extent,  the answer  to the first  question  involves  the way the 
OBE  organizes  the data. This disaggregation  makes  sense  if the course  of 
trade  in subcategories  is more similar  within  major  categories  than across 
major  categories.  Thus  a decision  was  made  to disaggregate,  within  the  end- 
use framework,  as far as possible  to see whether  similar  trade  patterns  ob- 
tain  within, and  dissimilar  patterns  across, categories. 
The second  question  called  for focus on trade  balances  by commodity 
groups.  This  focus,  of course,  does  not suggest  that all categories  "should" 
show surpluses,  or that categories  showing  large  and growing  deficits  dis- 
play  "weakness"  that  necessarily  should  be corrected  by policy  action.  The 
net balance  of payments  should be in equilibrium  on whatever  basis is 
thought  appropriate,  while  within  it some items  show deficits,  and others 
surpluses.  Furthermore,  the basic  notion  of comparative  advantage  implies 
that the United States  should  be a net importer  of some goods and a net 
exporter  of others. 
But  even  at the  finest  level  of statistical  disaggregation  that is available,  it 
appears  that  most goods are  subject  to two-way  trade.  Thereby,  the notion 
of comparative  advantage  becomes  the proposition  that the United States 
should  be a net exporter  of goods  in which  it has  a comparative  advantage- 
whether  it derives  from resource  endowment,  technological  advantage,  or 
education  embodied  in human  capital-and  a net importer  of goods in 
which  it is at a disadvantage.3  Thus  it is natural  to focus on net exports  by 
commodity  group  in an analysis  that attempts  to reveal  something  about 
movements  in U.S. comparative  advantage  and  trade.4 
3. Strictly  speaking,  in a list of commodities  ordered  from those with maximum  net 
exports to those with maximum net imports, the United States has a comparative 
advantage  in producing  the goods higher on the list relative  to those lower on the list. 
4. Disaggregation  of the end-use data in an analysis focusing on net exports runs 
into the problem  that, beyond the two-digit  level, export and import  categories  do not 
match.  This arises  because  a major  criterion  the OBE  used  for creating  subcategories  was 
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TRENDS  IN  AGGREGATE  END-USE  CATEGORIES 
Table 1 shows  net exports  for seven  major  export  end-use  categories  for 
the years  1925-70,  excluding  the war  years  1941-45.  In the table,  total non- 
agricultural  industrial  supplies  and  materials  were  disaggregated  into three 
parts:  fuels  and  lubricants;  chemicals;  and a residual  component.  This dis- 
aggregation  is necessary  for two reasons.  Fuels and lubricants  include  as 
major  subcategories  crude  petroleum  and  semifinished  petroleum  products 
and  natural  gas,  in which  trade  is heavily  influenced  both  by natural  resource 
advantages  and by government  policies.  Chemicals  are shown separately 
because  they are the only three-digit  category  among  nonagricultural  in- 
dustrial  supplies  and materials  to show a surplus  consistently  since  World 
War  II. 
Agricultural  goods. From 1925  to 1959,  the U.S. trade  balance  in agricul- 
tural  goods  typically  fluctuated  in the range  from  a surplus  of $1 billion  to a 
deficit  of $1  billion.  Then  from  1960  through  1967,  agricultural  trade  showed 
surpluses  in the range  from  $0.7  billion  to $1.7  billion.  Since  1967,  the sur- 
plus  has  been  considerably  smaller-between  $100  million  and  $500  million. 
Thus, between  1964 and 1970, a substantial  deterioration  took place in 
trade in agricultural  goods as the surplus  fell from $1.7 billion to $0.5 
billion. 
Fuels  and  lubricants.  Trade  in fuels  and  lubricants  consistently  showed  a 
small  surplus  from  1925  through  1940.  At the  end  of the  war,  exports  jumped 
beyond the prewar  experience,  and then maintained  a fairly flat trend, 
around  which, however,  large swings occurred.  On the other hand,  just 
after  the war,  imports  picked  up at the  prewar  level,  but grew  rapidly  there- 
after.  Thus  in fuel  and  lubricants,  what  began  as a substantial  surplus  in the 
late 1940s  became  a balance  in the mid-1950s  and  a steadily  growing  deficit 
in the 1960s.  This  pattern  is frequently  seen  in industrial  supplies  and  mate- 
rials  and  in consumer  goods. 
Chemicals.  A different  pattern  appears  in chemicals  (including  fertilizers 
but excluding  medicinal  preparations).  From 1925  to 1937  trade  in these 
products  roughly  balanced.  Then  in 1938-40  a small  but growing  surplus 
appeared.  After the war, exports  started  off substantially  above imports, 
applied separately  on the export and import sides. In disaggregating  beyond the two- 
digit level, therefore,  the analysis here basically  follows the export end-use categories, 
assigning import categories to the relevant export groups. For a  discussion of the 
rationale and structure  of the end-use groupings,  see U.S. Exports and Imports,  pp. 
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which were roughly  at their prewar  level, then grew substantially  faster 
than imports  throughout  the period  1946-70,  although  imports  picked  up 
distinctly  in the late 1960s. 
Other nonagricultural  industrial  supplies and materials. The category of 
other  industrial  supplies  and materials,  as shown  in Table 1, is a hetero- 
geneous  group  of products,  as can be seen  in Table  7. Most of them  have 
shown  deficits  throughout  the  period  1925-70.  Some  of the  more  interesting 
subcategories  will  be  discussed  in  the  section  on  disaggregated  trade  patterns. 
Capital  goods. Capital  goods have had a surplus  in every  year of the 
period  1925-70.  As is apparent  in Figure 1, imports  were  very  flat before 
World  War  II, varying  in the range  of $10  million  to $40 million,  while  ex- 
ports  generally  were  in the $400 million to $600 million range.  After the 
war,  capital  goods  exports  showed  the  typical  bump  in the late 1940s,  yield- 
ing a much  higher  surplus  than  in the prewar  years.  That  surplus  has  grown 
rapidly  and  remarkably  consistently  to the present,  exceeding  $10  billion  in 
1970. 
Consumer  goods. Consumer  goods (excluding  food and beverages)  de- 
scribe  a pattern  completely  different  from  that  of capital  goods,  as Figures  1 
and 2 confirm.  Before  World  War  II, the United  States  typically  was a net 
importer  of consumer  goods  by a small  margin.  Immediately  after  the war, 
a sizable  surplus  emerged  as exports  quadrupled  from  around  $250  million 
to $1 billion.  After  this  postwar  bulge  disappeared,  exports  grew  slowly  but 
steadily.  Imports  of consumer  goods, on the other  hand,  have  expanded  at 
an increasingly  rapid  pace,  overtaking  exports  in 1959.  With  the exception 
of a slight  decrease  in 1961,  the deficit  has increased  ever  since. 
The plot of consumer  goods trade  in Figure  2 suggests  two generaliza- 
tions. First,  once  the postwar  bulge  in consumer  goods  exports  had disap- 
peared  and  the irregularly  declining  surplus  dwindled  away,  the deficit  grew 
steadily,  not settling  at one level as it had before the war. Second,  the 
growth  in the deficit  was not a result  simply  of excess  demand  in the late 
1960s.  The data reveal  it in the shrinkage  of the surplus  beginning  in the 
early  1950s. 
Automotive  products.  In automotive  products,  the United States  had a 
surplus  every  year  until 1968,  but since  then has had an increasing  deficit. 
There  was a small  but steady  surplus  before  World  War  II, following  a pat- 
tern  quite  similar  to that of capital  goods  (see Figure  1). After  the war  the 
familiar  export  bulge  appeared,  but was eliminated  by the early  1950s.  Ex- 
ports  grew  erratically  from 1953  to 1962,  and at a smoothly  increasing  rate 10  1.  T--  00n  oo  tn  M  In  oo  tn  In  -  N  oN 
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Figure 1.  U.S. Imports  and Exports of Capital Goods, 1925-70, 
Billions of dollars 
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Figure  2. U.S. Imports  and  Exports  of Consumer  Goods,  1925-70, 
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after  that. Imports  did not appear  at a significant  level until about 1955. 
They  then  grew  at an increasing  rate-with a relapse  in 1959-61-and over- 
took exports  in 1968,  causing  a deficit  that has been growing  ever  since. 
Some  of the recent  expansion  in both imports  and  exports  has been due 
to the U.S.-Canadian  auto agreement  of 1965. On balance, automotive 
trade  with Canada  has shifted  from a fairly  steady  surplus  ranging  from 
$400  million  to $600  million  in 1960-65,  to a deficit  of $1.1  billion  in 1970. 
Nevertheless,  the underlying  trend  in automotive  trade  is similar  to that 
shown  in Table  1. The  following  data  on U.S. trade  in automotive  products 
(shown  in millions  of dollars)  suggest  that, aside  from  trade  with Canada 
(which  they exclude),  the trend  has been from surplus  to deficit: 
1965  1966  1967  1968  1969  1970 
369  90  -6  -602  -701  -1,193 
In summary,  the data  of Table  1 give  a strong  impression  that  U.S. trade 
since  World  War  II has been  characterized  by growing  surpluses  in capital 
goods and  chemicals,  growing  deficits  in consumer  goods and other  indus- 
trial materials,  and a deteriorating  balance  in automotive  products.  The 
next  section  compares  the  trends  in U.S. trade  in finished  goods  in the 1960s 
with  those of other  industrial  countries. 
The U.S. Competitive  Position  in the Industrial  World 
One important  conclusion  from  the preceding  description  of longer-run 
trends  in U.S. trade  is that  the  time  of stable  deficits  and  surpluses  in various 
categories  of trade  has passed.  The increased  dynamism  in trade  flows is 
one of the reasons  for the difficulty  in explaining  the current  deterioration 
in the  U.S. trade  balance.  Some  observers  look to the  previous  period  of ex- 
cess demand  and continuing  inflation  as a major  cause,  and conclude  that 
the United States  has suffered  a once-for-all  loss in competitiveness.  They 
propose  exchange  rate adjustments,  accompanied  by appropriate  demand 
management  policies,  both to correct  the current  imbalance  and  to prevent 
new disequilibrium; 
Others  emphasize  the longer-run  loss of comparative  advantage  asso- 
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abroad,  and  so on. They  recommend  additional  remedies  that  directly  affect 
supply  factors  and that are  likely  to be of a microeconomic  nature.5 
One way to determine  the basic  explanation  is to identify  any great  dif- 
ferences  in recent  demand  and  output  trends  between  the United  States  and 
other  industrial  countries.  For example,  a large  rise  in the import  share  of 
domestic  consumption  does not by itself  indicate  a shift  in comparative  ad- 
vantage.6  Any judgment  needs  to take into account  whether  import  pene- 
tration  of domestic  markets  had  been  accompanied  by losses  of export  mar- 
kets.  And  if export  losses  had  occurred,  the explanation  might  depend  upon 
whether  the composition  of world  demand  had shifted  to the disadvantage 
of U.S. producers.  This section,  therefore,  will examine  the trends  in U.S. 
trade  in the 1960s  in terms  of the balance  between  output  and  consumption 
in the United States, and compare  them with trends  in other industrial 
countries.  These  comparisons  have  no normative  implication:  There  is no 
reason  why one country's  output  and demand  pattern  should  conform  to 
the average  of all industrial  countries.  Indeed,  it would  be remarkable  if it 
did.  Underlying  economic  growth  rates  vary  among  countries  because  pop- 
ulation  trends  vary,  if for no other  reason,  and actual  growth  trends  differ, 
if for no other  reason,  because  policy objectives  differ.  But international 
comparisons  require  some international  average  (or standard)  as a yard- 
stick. In demonstrating  how developments  vary among countries,  these 
comparisons  can point  to the direction  in which  answers  should  be sought. 
THE STATISTICAL  FRAMEWORK 
The analysis  in this section  rests  upon a translation  of trade  data from 
SITC definitions  into end-use type categories  for all countries of the 
5. Clearly, the effects of neither of these causes can be termed "temporary."  The 
effects  of inflationary  excesses  on the price  structure  can no more  be reversed  by resump- 
tion of noninflationary  growth than possible past misjudgments  about the importance 
of investing  in particular  kinds of human or other capital can be reversed  by proper 
allocation of new resources,  although both developments  would help prevent  further 
deterioration.  Given the balance-of-payments  constraint  and the aim to make the most 
efficient  use of resources,  the choice is between  different  kinds of action, rather  than, as 
is sometimes  argued,  between  inaction and action. On this reasoning  it is important  to 
determine  the most crucial  explanation  among those that are being advanced. 
6. The word  consumption  is used  here  in the widest  sense,  to cover  all levels  of demand 
including  capital goods, and thus as a shorthand  denotation of resource  absorption. 296  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1971 
OECD.7  The trade categories  studied  correspond  to five major demand 
groups:  food, consumer  durable  goods,  consumer  nondurable  goods,  pass- 
enger  cars, and capital  goods. GNP data for fourteen  industrial  countries 
were  broken  down  into matching  categories,  making  it possible  to compare, 
across  countries  and by categories,  the shifts  in shares  of domestic  output 
absorbed  by domestic  consumption,  the shares  of domestic  consumption 
satisfied  by foreign production,  and so forth.8  Exports  by the fourteen 
countries  in these  five  product  groups,  which  together  constitute,  roughly,  a 
finished  goods  category,  amount  to about  50 percent  of all OECD  exports. 
Exports  of industrial  supplies  and  materials,  an end-use  grouping  for which 
no matching  GNP category  exists,  are  40 percent,  and  the  remaining  10  per- 
cent  are  accounted  for by exports  in unallocated  categories  and  by trade  of 
the smaller  OECD  countries  not included  in this study. 
The data  cover  the period  from 1961  to 1968,  so that,  unfortunately,  the 
divergent  cyclical  developments  between  the United States  and the rest of 
the industrial  world  from  late 1969  onward  cannot  be analyzed.  However, 
the period  is sufficiently  long to throw  some light on relative  demand  and 
supply  trends  among  industrial  countries  in the 1960s.  For this  purpose,  the 
second  half of the decade  is contrasted  with the average  for 1961-64.  Al- 
though  the  U.S. economy  was  operating  below  full  employment  in 1961-64, 
the gap  was  being  narrowed,  prices  were  relatively  stable,  and  the trade  bal- 
ance  was  in large  surplus,  around  $5 billion  or so annually.  By the first  half 
of the 1960s,  other  countries,  except  perhaps  Japan,  had fully completed 
their postwar  reconstruction.  Germany  and the Netherlands  had made 
some  upward  adjustment  of their  exchange  rates  in recognition  of this fact, 
and quantitative  trade  restrictions  had been largely  removed  (again  with 
the exception  of those  applied  by and  against  Japan).  Thus,  the period  pro- 
7. These data were developed  by Kathryn  A. Morisse  at the Board of Governors  of 
the Federal Reserve  System. A qualitative  description  of the data problems  is available 
from her on request.  It should be noted that this classification  follows the general  lines 
of the OBE categories,  but the results  are not strictly comparable  mainly because  the 
export and import classification  schemes  are not identical  for certain  categories.  This 
leads occasionally  to wide divergences  from the published  OBE data. 
8. For a description  of the data and their  adequacy,  see Betty  L. Barker  and Barbara 
R.  Lowrey, "Gross National Product Data, by Selected Components, for Fourteen 
Industrial  Countries,"  Board of Governors  of the Federal  Reserve  System, "Review  of 
Foreign Developments,"  No.  662 (November 30, 1970; processed). GNP data were 
converted  to U.S. dollars  at 1967  rates of exchange. William H. Branson and Helen B. Junz  297 
vides  a relatively  good  base  for comparisons  of changes  in competitive  per- 
formance.  Comparisons  in this section are generally  made with the year 
1968.  That  year  was  not an ideal  one, in terms  of cyclical  balance.  But  using 
a 1967-68  average  would  have  prejudiced  the results  even  more,  since  1967 
saw  a recession  in Germany  and  low growth  in the  United  States.  Whenever 
possible,  abrupt  changes  in trend in 1968 are noted. The basic data on 
which subsequent  tables in this section are drawn, are summarized  in 
Table  2. 
OUTPUT  AND  DEMAND  PATTERNS  IN  THE INDUSTRIAL  WORLD 
The changes  in the structure  of output and consumption  of industrial 
countries  mark  the sixties  as a decade  of growing  trade  involvement.  Im- 
ports and exports  of industrial  countries  expanded  much  faster  than their 
domestic  output, as is shown in Table 3. Of course,  this development  is 
bound  up with  the creation  of the European  Economic  Community  (EEC) 
and  the  European  Free  Trade  Association  (EFTA).  But  the  rapid  expansion 
of trade  among  the EEC,  EFTA,  North  America,  and  Japan  suggests  that 
the interchange  of goods among  industrial  nations  would  have  grown  rap- 
idly anyway.  Thus, it is not surprising,  and  should  be no a priori  cause  for 
alarm,  that the share  of domestic  markets  supplied  by domestic  producers 
has  declined  almost  everywhere  in almost  every  category.  For all categories 
and  all fourteen  countries  together,  it fell from  an average  of 92.7  percent  in 
1961-64  to 91.3 percent  in 1968, a  1/2 percent  decrease.  In other  words, 
consumption  has become  increasingly  cosmopolitan. 
A better  test of changes  in competitive  position  than  the degree  of pene- 
tration  of domestic  markets  by foreign  producers  is the  relationship  between 
domestic  output  and domestic  consumption.  This  ratio,  shown  in Table  4, 
includes  changes  in exports  as well as in imports.  It reflects  both shifts  in 
trade  balances  and  the relation  of the size of the trade  balance  to total out- 
put.9  Thus,  the extent  of the improvement  in the  trade  positions  of Belgium, 
9. The absolute  level of (as distinct  from the change  in) the ratio of domestic  output 
to domestic  consumption  is not very  meaningful.  The adequacy  of the share  of consump- 
tion covered  by domestic output depends  upon a country's  balance-of-payments  struc- 
ture in general,  and upon its need to import  industrial  materials  in particular  (since the 
ratios given here capture trade in finished goods only). But changes in the ratio of 
domestic output to  domestic consumption readily demonstrate  shifts in  the trade 
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Table 3.  Growth  of Output, Demand, and Trade in Selected Finished  Goods, 
from 1961-64 Average to 1968, All Industrial  Countries  and 
the United States 




domestic  Domestic 
Domestic  con-  con- 
Countries  and  goods  output  Exports  sumption  Imports  sumption 
Industrial  countries, 
including  the United  States 
Food  39  33  39  32  38 
Consumer  durables  55  108  49  132  56 
Consumer  nondurables  50  81  49  132  51 
Passenger  cars  68  151  59  245  71 
Excluding  U.S.-Canadian  trade  68  94  65  148  71 
Capital  goods  63  73  60  87  64 
Total  50  74  48  79  50 
Excluding  U.S.-Canadian 
auto trade  50  70  48  74  50 
United  States 
Food  30  11  31  46  32 
Consumer  durables  57  78  56  153  60 
Consumer  nondurables  45  46  45  131  46 
Passenger  cars  56  258  53  511  64 
Excluding  U.S.-Canadian  trade  60  57  60  225  64 
Capital  goods  67  55  69  74  74 
Total  46  48  46  131  48 
Excluding  U.S.-Canadian 
auto trade  46  42  46  112  48 
Sources: Same as Table 2. 
Note: Domestic output minus exports equals domestic output for domestic consumption; the latter plus 
imports equals domestic consumption (GNP). 
Germany,  Italy, Japan,  and Switzerland  that took place  between  1961-64 
and 1968  is reflected  clearly  in the movement  of this ratio. The deteriora- 
tion in the U.S. trade  position  over  the period  becomes  equally  apparent. 
Extension  of the data  through  1969  probably  would  sharpen  this  picture. 
The dwindling  of the U.S. overall  trade  surplus,  from  over  $5 billion  an- 
nually  in 1961-64  to virtually  zero  in 1968,  is paralleled  by the change  in the 
surplus  on finished  goods:  Over  the period  this  surplus  fell  from  1.3  percent 
of domestic  expenditures  on finished  goods  to just below  zero.  To what  ex- William  H. Branson  and  Helen  B. Junz  303 
Table  4. Domestic  Output  of Finished  Goods  in Industrial  Countries  as a 
Percent  of Domestic  Consumption,  Selected  Periods,  1961-68 
Average, 
Country  1961-64  1964  1966  1968 
United States  101.3  101.4  100.7  99.6 
Austria  92.4  93.8  90.4  92.2 
BLEU  94.1  94.0  95.5  97.6 
Canada  92.9  93.7  92.7  92.6 
Denmark  111.1  109.5  109.2  108.1 
France  100.7  100.1  100.4  100.5 
Germany  105.3  106.0  106.4  108.7 
Italy  102.4  102.4  104.9  106.1 
Japan  101.6  101.6  103.4  104.0 
Netherlands  99.6  97.6  97.9  99.5 
Norway  88.7  89.9  87.6  86.8 
Sweden  94.5  94.7  95.4  96.4 
Switzerland  99.2  98.4  102.3  104.4 
United Kingdom  99.2  99.2  99.6  99.4 
Total  100.9  100.9  100.9  100.8 
Sources: Same as Table 2. 
tent can this change  be explained  by shifts  in the structure  of U.S. output 
and demand,  compared  with  those  in the rest  of the industrial  world?  And 
can any  conclusions  be drawn  about  the permanence  of this change? 
COMPARATIVE  ANALYSIS  OF OUTPUT  AND  DEMAND  PATTERNS 
Over  the 1960s  the output  of finished  goods grew  somewhat  more  slowly 
in the  United  States  than  in the rest  of the industrial  world,  as Table  3 dem- 
onstrates.  The share  of U.S. output  consumed  at home remained  almost 
stable.  But, as imports  approximately  doubled,  the share  of the home  mar- 
ket supplied  domestically  was  reduced  from  97.1  percent  in 1961-64  to 95.5 
percent  in 1968,  a fall of 111/2  percent.  This  was  more  or less in line with  the 
home-market  shares  given  up by domestic  producers  in the EEC  countries 
(their  share  of their  domestic  market  was  reduced  from  88.3  percent  to 87.2 
percent  over  the period).10  Unlike  the United States,  however,  these  coun- 
tries experienced  increases  in production  for export  that more than offset 
10. When U.S.-Canadian  automobile  trade is excluded,  the U.S. loss in its domestic 
market  was exactly  in line with that of other industrial  countries. 304  Brookings Papers on Economic ActivIty, 2:1971 
losses  in home-market  sales,  so that  in these  countries  the  ratio  of output  to 
domestic  final  demand  increased.  In the United States,  export  sales  barely 
outpaced  the growth  of domestic  deliveries  to the home market,  which  in 
turn  fell short  of the growth  of domestic  demand.  Consequently,  with the 
much  faster  expansions  of export  sales by foreign  producers,  the share  of 
U.S. producers  in foreign  markets  as well as in the U.S. market  was re- 
duced,  as can be seen  in part  C of Table  2 above." 
To what  extent  have  shifts  in the commodity  structure  of production  and 
demand  played a role in the losses in U.S. market  shares  at home and 
abroad,  and to what extent  can these changes  be attributed  to excess  de- 
mand?  At least  partial  answers  to these  questions  can  be found  by compar- 
ing actual  developments  in U.S. output,  demand,  and  trade  for each of the 
product  categories  with  those  that  would  have  occurred  if they  had  matched 
those of the rest of the industrial  world.  Under  this hypothesis,  U.S. pro- 
ducers  would  have  maintained  their  share  in the  industrial  world's  output  in 
each category  from 1961-64  onward  and they would have claimed  a con- 
stant  share  of export  markets.  At the same  time, purchasers  in the United 
States  would  have  absorbed  a constant  share  of the industrial  world's  sup- 
ply of goods in each category,  and that part of U.S. consumption  that is 
satisfied  by foreign  goods  would  have expanded  in line with  the growth  of 
total imports  of industrial  countries. 
Whenever  domestic demand expanded  significantly  above the world 
trend  without  a commensurate  increase  in supply,  excess  demand  is taken 
to be the likely explanation.  Whenever  growth  in supply  fell short of de- 
mand  and  demand  did not grow  faster  than the world trend,  the explana- 
tion is assumed  to lie primarily  in structural  factors.  The  dollar  figures  given 
in Table 5 suggest  the extent  of the major  factor  that underlies  the trade 
balance  changes;  but  they  can indicate  general  magnitudes  only.  Neverthe- 
less, they are  a useful  guide  to the correct  answers  and  will be employed  as 
such in further  work.  The comparisons  between  actual  developments  and 
those calculated  on the basis of the constant-share  hypothesis,  given in 
Table  5, demonstrate  clearly  that  the overall  change  in the U.S. trade  posi- 
11. The table shows the exports  of individual  countries  as a share of total exports  by 
industrial  countries.  This share would be expressed  more properly  as a percentage  of 
the export sales of all countries  excluding  those to the country  for which comparisons 
are made. The data will be adjusted  accordingly,  pending the completion of a trade 
matrix by end-use categories. The global conclusions drawn here, however, are not 
likely to be materially  affected  by this correction. William H. Branson and Helen B. Junz  305 
Table 5.  Changes in U.S.  Output, Demand, and Trade, 1968, Actual and 
Estimated on Hypothesis of Maintenance of 1961-64 Shares 
in Total for All Industrial  Countries 




domestic  Domestic 
Domestic  con-  con- 
Commodity  group  output"  Exports  sumption  Imports  sumption 
Food 
Actual  113.3  3.7  109.6  5.5  115.1 
Calculated  120.6  4.4  116.2  4.9  121.1 
Difference  -7.3  -0.7  -6.6  +0.6  -6.0 
Consumer  durable  goods 
Actual  46.3  1.2  45.1  3.2  48.3 
Calculated  46.0  1.4  44.6  2.6  47.2 
Difference  +0.3  -0.2  +0.5  +0.6  +1.1 
Consumer  nondurable  goods 
Actual  117.1  1.2  115.9  2.0  117.9 
Calculated  121.0  1.5  119.5  2.1  121.6 
Difference  -3.9  -0.3  -3.6  -0.1  -3.7 
Capital  goods 
Actual  64.4  8.5  55.9  3.1  59.0 
Calculated  62.7  9.5  53.2  2.4  55.6 
Difference  +1.7  -1.0  +2.7  +0.7  +3.4 
Total 
Actual  341.1  14.6  326.5  13.8  340.4 
Calculated  350.3  16.8  333.5  12.0  345.5 
Difference  -9.2  -2.2  -7.0  +1.8  -5.2 
Sources: Same as Table 2. Figures are rounded and may not subtract to differences. 
a.  Domestic output less exports equals domestic output for domestic consumption; the latter plus imports 
equals domestic consumption. 
tion was brought  about  by quite  divergent  movements  among  the product 
categories.12  In addition,  they point to rather  different  explanations  of the 
movements  for the various  categories. 
12. Since the U.S.-Canadian  automobile  agreement  is a fact of life, it does not seem 
worthwhile  to speculate  about what would have happened  in its absence.  Therefore,  no 
constant-share  calculations  were made for passenger  cars. 306  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1971 
Food. The trade  balance  for the food group,  according  to the constant- 
share  comparison,  was  adversely  affected  by a shortfall  in exports,  as well  as 
by an excess  of imports,  totaling  about  $1  1/2  billion.  This  development  does 
not appear  to be associated  with  excess  demand,  however.  In fact,  demand 
for food products  rose rather  less in the United  States  than elsewhere.  But 
output  fell even further  short of the world  trend.  This decline  in the U.S. 
output  share  reflects  the acceleration  of output growth  elsewhere,  stimu- 
lated, as noted earlier,  by agricultural  policies  in various  countries.  As a 
result,  the trade  deficit  in food products  that the industrial  countries  have 
generally  run with the rest of the world  has not expanded  as fast as food 
consumption;  that deficit  rose  from  $6.8  billion  to $8.9 billion  between  the 
1961-64  average  and 1968. 
The changes  in output  and trade  in food products  for the United States 
also reflect  the slower  rate  in the expansion  of U.S. consumption  demand, 
compared  with other  countries.  The rise in U.S. imports  above  the trend 
probably  reflects  taste  changes  as well as price  competition.  Consequently, 
the trends  that have  become  apparent  in the changes  in this product  cate- 
gory  appear  to be largely  of a longer-run  structural  nature. 
Durable  consumer  goods. Unlike food, the constant-share  comparison 
for durable  consumer  goods clearly  shows  the effects  of excess  demand  in 
the United States.  Although  U.S. supply  of these goods rose faster  than 
that  of the  industrial  world,  it did  not match  the  even  larger  deviations  from 
the world  trend  in consumption  demand.  The accompanying  loss in export 
and  domestic  markets  compared  with  the constant-share  hypothesis  totaled 
about $3/  billion. 
Nondurable  conswner  goods. Trends  in nondurable  consumer  goods ap- 
pear  superficially  much  like those  in food products.  However,  the basic  sit- 
uation  is quite  different.  Unlike  food  products,  nondurable  consumer  goods 
are  generally  produced  and  traded  in nonregulated  markets.  Furthermore, 
U.S. producers  have not had a relative  advantage  in producing  consumer 
goods,  as they  have  in food products. 
Growth  of both output  and  consumption  of nondurable  consumer  goods 
in the United  States  fell short  of industrial-world  trends.  But  they  did so to 
about  an equal  extent,  so that, in theory,  the trade  position  could  have  re- 
mained  unchanged.  In fact,  the loss of domestic  market  shares  sustained  by 
U.S. producers  was more or less in line with that of foreign  producers  in 
their  own home markets.  But U.S. producers  were  unable  to make  up for 
this loss in foreign  markets,  so that the constant-share  calculation  shows  a William H. Branson and Helen B. Junz  307 
slight  deterioration  in the  trade  position.  In this  respect,  the  United  States  is 
not very  different  from  many  other  industrial  countries.  The EFTA coun- 
tries  (except  Sweden),  Belgium,  Germany,  and  the  Netherlands  all show  the 
same  trend.  The increase  in the U.S. trade  deficit  in nondurable  consumer 
goods thus seems to be affected  less by demand  pressures  than by the 
longer-run  structural  fact that many  highly  industrialized  countries  do not 
have  a comparative  advantage  in producing  many  of the goods  included  in 
this category. 
Capital  goods. The changes  in supply  and demand  of capital  goods are 
much  like those for durable  consumer  goods, except  that the trends  stand 
out even  more  clearly.  The similarity  is not surprising  since  many  durable 
consumer  goods are near-capital  goods. Production  expanded  appreciably 
faster  in the United States  than  elsewhere.  But the U.S. capital  investment 
boom in the second  half of the 1960s  pushed  demand  even further  above 
the industrial-world  trend.  The shortfall  in output  relative  to demand  was 
made  up in part  by a reduction  below  the trend  in the expansion  of export 
sales, allowing  domestic  deliveries  to the home market  to increase  consid- 
erably  above  their  trend.  As a result,  only a relatively  small  part  of the ex- 
cess demand  was satisfied  by extra  imports. 
CONCLUSIONS  FROM THE  COMPARATIVE  DATA 
The changes  in the pattern  of U.S. output  and  demand  during  the second 
half  of the 1960s  sum  to a shift  in the  trade  balance  on finished  goods  from a 
surplus  of $3.4 billion  in 1961-64  to a deficit  of $1.2 billion  in 1968 (the 
deficit  is $0.4 billion when U.S.-Canadian  trade  in passenger  cars is ex- 
cluded).  This $4'/2 billion swing arose from the combined  workings of 
longer-run  basic  trends  and the excess  demand  that existed  through  1968. 
The larger  part of the deterioration  is attributable  to shifts  in competi- 
tiveness  rather  than  to an adverse  composition  of U.S. output.  The  increase 
in the relative  importance  of the demand  of other  countries  for imported 
capital  goods  almost  offset  the relative  decline  in their  demand  for  imported 
food; these two categories  accounted  for 70 to 721/2  percent  (depending 
upon inclusion  or exclusion  of U.S.-Canadian  automobile  trade)  of U.S. 
industrial  exports  in 1968.  Furthermore,  changes  in the commodity  struc- 
ture of U.S. output  paralleled  these changes  in the composition  of world 
demand.  Thus, only a relatively  small part-perhaps $1/2  billion-of  the 
deterioration  in the U.S. trade  balance  on finished  goods  is explained  in this 
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Table 6.  U.S. Trade Balance, 1968, and Changes  from the 1961-64 Average 
Bilions of dollars 
Change  from 1961-64 average 
1968  Actual 
less  Major 
Category  Actual  Calculated  Actual  Calculated calculated  factor 
Food  -1.8  -0.5  -1.3  0.0  -1.3  Structural 
factors 
Consumer  -2.0  -1.2  -1.4  -0.6  -0.8  Excess 
durables  demand 
Consumer  -0.8  -0.  6  -0.8  -0.6  -0.2  Structural 
nondurables  factors 
Capital  goods  +5.4  +7.1  +0.8  +2.5  -1.7  Excess 
demand 
Total  +0.6  +5.0  -2.7  +1.3  -4.0  ... 
Sources: Same as Table 2. Figures are rounded and may not add to totals. 
More  important  than shifts  in the commodity  composition  of world  de- 
mand  were  aggregate  demand  developments  in the United  States  itself.  In- 
flationary  pressures  and excess  demand  cut into the U.S. trade  position  in 
consumer  durables  and  capital  goods.  As shown  inTable6,thetrade  surplus 
on capital  goods, at $5.4 billion  in 1968,  had grown  by $% billion from 
1961-644  In the absence  of excess demand,  it might have been roughly 
$21/2  billion  above  the 1961-64  level.  And the deficit  on consumer  durables, 
which  widened  by almost  $11/2  billion  in the interval,  would  have  grown  by 
less  than  half  this  amount.  Thus,  on the basis  of these  two categories,  excess 
demand  may have accounted  for roughly  $21/2  billion  of the decline  in the 
trade  balance  for finished  goods.'3 
The rise in the import  surplus  in nondurable  goods and food, however, 
cannot  be ascribed  primarily  to the failure  of demand  management  policies 
in the  second  half  of the 1960s.  To be sure,  part  of the change  was  associated 
with the worsening  of the relative  price  position  of U.S. producers.  But it 
appears  that  underlying  trends,  reflecting  structural  factors,  were  also  push- 
ing in a downward  direction:  Structural  changes  in the supply  of, and mar- 
ket regulations  for, food products  in industrial  countries  adversely  affected 
13. These  dollar  figures  can indicate  only rough  magnitudes  of the relative  importance 
of each of these factors in the total change  in the U.S. trade position. The difference  in 
percentage  changes  shown  in Table 3 probably  gives a slightly  better,  though  also rough, 
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U.S. exports;  at the same  time,  there  was  an accentuation  of the longer-run 
tendency  for  the  United  States  to be a net  importer  of nondurable  consumer 
goods. The trend  toward  import  surpluses  in the latter  category  reflected 
largely  the failure  of U.S. producers  to retain  the export  markets  that they 
had  secured  immediately  after  the  war  but  that  were  not traditionally  theirs. 
Probably  about $1 billion-or  one-half of the deterioration  between 
1961-64  and 1968  in the trade  position  in food and nondurable  consumer 
goods-reflected structural  factors  in export  markets.  And about $1/2  bil- 
lion of the  rise  in imports  over  the  period  can  be ascribed  to changes  in taste 
and other  underlying  trends.  Some  of these  trends  are  world-wide;  others, 
however,  arise  from  factors  peculiar  to the structure  of U.S. industrial  out- 
put, The next two sections  seek to identify  commodity  groups  for which 
longer-run  tendencies-whether  toward surplus or deficit-seem to  be 
most clearly  defined  and  then  to explore  the possibility  of explaining  them 
by production  characteristics. 
Disaggregated  Patterns  of Trade  in Manufactured  Goods 
Patterns  of U.S. trade  in manufactured  goods,  disaggregated  into thirty- 
one end-use  commodity  groups,  are outlined  in Table 7.14  The table at- 
tempts  to summarize  the movements  of exports  and imports  of manufac- 
tured  goods down  to the level  represented  by four-digit  end-use  codes. Se- 
lected  commodities  serve  as illustrations  of four  general  points. 
FROM RAW  INPUTS  TO  FINISHED  PRODUCTS:  STEEL 
Within  a given  industry,  such as steel or petroleum,  the U.S. trade  bal- 
ance  tends  to move from deficit  to surplus  along  the industrial  scale  from 
14. The subsequent  analysis focuses on trade in manufactured  goods, for several 
reasons.  First,  and perhaps  most important,  trade  in agricultural  goods is greatly  affected 
by nonmarket  activities, mainly government  subsidy and import programs  in all the 
developed  countries, and the P.L. 480 agricultural  aid program  in the United States. 
This general  intervention  is much more extensive  in agricultural  trade than in trade in 
manufactured  goods, and could easily obscure underlying  trends in comparative  ad- 
vantages.  In addition, the cross-section  data used below to assess the basis for U.S. 
comparative  advantage  in the mid-1960s  relate only to trade in nonagricultural  goods, 
although  it includes  trade in goods from the mining  industry. L.  0  O) 
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raw  materials  to semifinished  products  to finished  products.  Iron and steel 
and  finished  metals  provide  a good example. 
The  trade  balance  in iron and  steel  is depicted  in Figure  3. In basic  mate- 
rials,  a surplus  appears  in the 1930s,  but almost  continuous  deficits  existed 
after  1946,  widening  significantly  in the 1960s.  In iron and steel products, 
except advanced  manufactures,  a prewar  surplus  widened  after  the war, 
and then narrowed,  giving  way to balance  in the early 1960s,  but a deficit 
opened  from 1963  onward.  Finally,  in finished  metal  shapes  and advanced 
metal  manufactures  the surplus  that  began  to shrink  in the  late 1950s  disap- 
peared  in the late 1960s.15 
This  description  makes  clear  that  the United  States  has become  basically 
a net importer  of steel,  with  all three  levels  of the industry  net importers  by 
1970.  While  the  United  States  has  steadily  lost its comparative  advantage  in 
iron and steel in general,  the figure  also suggests  that, the more advanced 
the stage of production,  the longer  the U.S. trade advantage  was main- 
tained.16 
THE  POSTWAR  EXPORT  BULGE:  TEXTILES 
In several  commodities  the United States characteristically  had a bal- 
anced  or deficit  trade  position  before  World  War  II, enjoyed  a substantial 
surplus  with  a major  increase  in exports  just after  the war,  and  then  lost it in 
a growing  deficit  since  1950.  A good example  of this  pattern  is presented  by 
textiles,  both industrial  and  consumer  textiles,  as reflected  in the trade  bal- 
ances  shown  in Figure  4. 
The  postwar  export  bulge  in textiles  disappeared  by 1949,  leaving  exports 
essentially  flat  at $500  million  to $600  million  in industrial  textiles  and  $150 
million  to $200  million  in consumer  textiles  from  1950  on, with  little  growth 
in the latter  in the 1960s.  Imports,  however,  grew  in both cases.  Consumer 
'textile  imports  rose  slowly  from  1947  through  1954  and  increasingly  rapidly 
after 1954,  while industrial  textile  imports  grew  irregularly  from 1949  to 
15. A similar  pattern  can be seen in the petroleum  industry.  The United States has 
had a deficit in crude petroleum  trade since 1946, a deficit in semifinished  petroleum 
products  since 1949,  and a surplus  in finished  petroleum  products  that has been shrinking 
from a $520 million peak in 1951  to $71 million in 1970. 
16. This could, of course, be due either to a basic U.S. comparative  advantage  in 
more advanced  manufacturing,  or to an effective  tariff  structure  that favors  it. William  H. Branson  and  Helen  B. Junz  317 
Figure 3.  U.S. Trade Balance in Iron and Steel, 1925-7O 
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Figure 4.  U.S.  Trade Balance in Textiles and Man-made Fibers, 1925-70a 
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1961  and extremely  rapidly  after  that.  The United States  became  a net im- 
porter  of consumer  textiles  in 1955  and of industrial  textiles  in 1963.17 
THE PRODUCT  CYCLE:  MAN-MADE  FIBERS 
Disaggregation  to the four-digit  level makes  it possible  to determine  the 
pervasiveness  of the product  cycle  phenomenon.  In his seminal  paper,  Ray- 
mond  Vernon  suggested  that  trade  in manufactured  goods  typically  follows 
a cycle  in which  the United  States  is first  a net exporter  as a good is intro- 
duced  and  "shaken  down,"  and  then  becomes  a net  importer  as production 
of the good becomes  standardized  and moves  abroad  to minimize  produc- 
tion costs.18  Since  the product  cycle  involves  patterns  of trade  in individual 
commodities,  the likelihood  that  it can  be observed  increases  with  disaggre- 
gation  of the data. 
Man-made  fibers  constitute  a good illustration  of the product  cycle  (see 
Figure  4). From 1925 to 1940,  the United States  was typically  a net im- 
porter;  then, after  World  War  II to 1952,  trade  was roughly  balanced.  A 
substantial  export surplus  appeared  in 1956, and grew rapidly  to 1964 
under  the impetus  of export  growth;  imports  fluctuated  in the range  of $20 
million  to $50  million  from  1950  to 1963.  After  1962,  export  growth  slowed, 
and  beginning  in 1963,  imports  picked  up, so that  by 1970  the product  cycle 
was approaching  the net importing  stage,  with  imports  at $228  million  and 
the surplus  down  to $6 million.19 
The product  cycle  is, of course,  a microeconomic  phenomenon,  observ- 
able at the four-digit  level at best. That it can be observed  at that level of 
aggregation  suggests,  however,  that it is a fairly  widespread  phenomenon 
and  should  be taken  into account  in trade  projections.  At any  point  in time, 
17. Trade in footwear, luggage, and apparel of leather, fur, rubber, or plastic has 
followed a pattern  quite similar  to that of consumer  textiles. 
18. Raymond Vernon, "International  Investment and International  Trade in the 
Product  Cycle," Quarterly  Journal  of Economics,  Vol. 80 (May 1966), pp. 190-207. 
19. The same product  cycle can also be observed  in electrical  household appliances 
and in synthetic  rubber. By 1962 the United States was a net importer of electrical 
household appliances,  and by 1966 trade in synthetic rubber was roughly balanced. 
For examples  of the product  cycle at a disaggregated  level, see Seev Hirsch,  "The  United 
States  Electronics  Industry  in International  Trade,"  National  Institute  Economic  Review, 
No. 34 (November  1965),  pp. 92-97; and Louise  T. Wells,  Jr., "Test  of a Product Cycle 
Model of International  Trade:  U.S. Exports  of Consumer  Durables,"  Quarterly  Journal 
of Economics,  Vol. 83 (February  1969),  pp. 152-62. 320  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1971 
commodities  in which  a substantial  trade  surplus  exists  may be in the ma- 
turing  phase  of the cycle  with shrinking  surpluses,  while  products  just en- 
tering  it may be at trade  levels  too small  to seem  significant.  Thus  the exis- 
tence of the product  cycle may tend to bias trade  projections  made on a 
commodity-by-commodity  basis in a pessimistic  direction  (in the sense of 
small  surpluses). 
CONSISTENCY  WITHIN  AGGREGATES:  CAPITAL  AND  CONSUMER GOODS 
Finally,  the disaggregated  data  on trade  in capital  goods  and  in consumer 
goods exhibit  strikingly  similar  patterns  within  the aggregate  categories. 
Throughout  the period 1925-70, in each category  of capital goods, the 
United States  typically  has had a surplus,  which  has grown  substantially 
since  the early 1950s.  The only exception  is agricultural  machinery.  In the 
consumer  categories,  the United  States  typically  had  a deficit  before  the war 
and a surplus  just after  it. The surplus  then  shrank  to balance  in the middle 
or later 1950s  and a growing  deficit  developed  in the 1960s.  Thus  the pat- 
terns of trade  are similar  within  end-use  aggregates,  and dissimilar  across 
them,  confirming  the usefulness  of the OBE  categorization; 
CONCLUSIONS  FROM THE  LONG-TERM  DATA 
From  this survey  of the long-term  data,  it appears  that  the United  States 
has a growing  comparative  trade  advantage  in capital  goods  and  chemicals, 
but is at a disadvantage  in consumer  goods and other  industrial  supplies 
and  materials.  In consumer  goods,  the United  States  typically  had a deficit 
from  1925  to 1938,  and  after  a postwar  surplus,  returned  to a deficit  position 
starting  in 1959.  In some  industrial  supplies  and  materials-fuels and  lubri- 
cants, basic materials  for iron and steel, and their products-the United 
States  was a net exporter  before  World  War  II and became  a net importer 
thereafter. 
Part  of the movement  from  surplus  to deficit  in consumer  goods  and  non- 
chemical  industrial  supplies  and  materials  since  the late 1940s  has  been due 
to the loss of a temporary  advantage  after  World  War  II. This seems  to be 
the case  in consumer  goods  and  textiles,  although  the  trade  deficit  continued 
to increase  even after  the postwar  advantage  disappeared  in the mid-1950s. 
In these  areas,  as well as in steel  and  petroleum,  the loss of the postwar  ad- William H. Branson and Helen B. Junz  321 
vantage merely reinforced  the more fundamental  loss  of  competitive 
advantage. 
U.S. Comparative  Advantage  in Manufactured  Goods 
As the last section  shows,  since  the early  1960s  at latest  the United  States 
has  been  a net  exporter  of capital  goods  and  chemicals  and  a net  importer  of 
consumer  goods and other nonagricultural  industrial  supplies  and mate- 
rials,  with automotive  products  on the margin.  This pattern  of trade  holds 
even after  allowance  for the effects  of excess  demand  since 1965.  Thus it 
presumably  results  from underlying  relative  advantages  the United States 
has in production  of capital  and  chemical  goods and disadvantages  in pro- 
duction of consumer  goods and other industrial  supplies  and materials. 
What  then  is the source  of the U.S. comparative  advantage?  Is the produc- 
tion of net export  goods  relatively  intensive  in its use of physical  or human 
capital?  Does the U.S. comparative  advantage  lie in goods that exhibit 
economies  of scale  in production? 
To begin a study  of the sources  of U.S. comparative  advantage,  a 1964 
cross-section  of U.S. trade  in manufactured  goods by SITC  classifications 
is employed.  Nineteen  sixty-four  is chosen  because  it was the last year  be- 
fore the appearance  of excess  demand  and inflation  in the United States; 
while  the conclusions  concerning  the  trends  in U.S. trade  advantage  are  not 
changed  in any fundamental  way by adjusting  for the effects  of aggregate 
demand  associated  with  the Vietnam  war,  it seems  useful  to focus on a re- 
cent year that does not suffer  from this qualification.  More importantly, 
there  is a full set of data on production  characteristics  by SITC  three-digit 
categories  for the mid-1960s,  developed  by Hufbauer.20 
This preliminary  study of the sources  of comparative  advantage  essen- 
tially  consolidates  work  that has appeared  in the last few years,  relating  a 
number  of production  characteristics  to net exports  across  commodities. 
There  is nothing  particularly  new in the techniques  used  here,  or in the re- 
20. G. C. Hufbauer, "The Impact of National Characteristics  and Technology on 
the Commodity  Composition  of Trade  in Manufactured  Goods," in Raymond  Vernon 
(ed.), The Technology  Factor in International  Trade,  A Conference  of the Universities- 
National  Bureau  Committee  for Economic  Research  (Columbia  University  Press  for the 
National Bureau  of Economic  Research,  1970). See Hufbauer's  Table A-2 for the data 
on production  characteristics,  and his many references  to the recent literature  on the 
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sults.  The aim  has been  rather  to use data  that are  readily  available  to sum- 
marize  studies  that  have  been  done  to date,  present  some  illustrative  results 
that are typical  of this literature,  and provide  a starting  point for further 
research  on the question.2' 
DATA  ON  PRODUCTION  CHARACTERISTICS 
The analysis  relates  U.S. net exports  in 1964,  by 101 three-digit  SITC 
categories,  to four  production  characteristics:  physical  capital  per  man,  hu- 
man capital  per man, a measure  of economies  of scale  in production,  and 
the date at which  the commodity  first  entered  international  trade  in a sig- 
nificant  way. On a more  restricted  subset  of 61 three-digit  SITC  industries, 
research  and development  expenditures  are  introduced  into the analysis  as 
a fraction  of value added.  Finally,  at the two-digit  SITC  level, which  per- 
mits only 28 observations,  the analysis  incorporates  the ratio of skilled 
(professional,  technical,  and scientific)  workers  to total employment  by 
commodity. 
Factor endowments:  physical and hunan  capital. The  classical factor- 
endowments  theory of  international  trade, generally associated with 
Heckscher  and  Ohlin,  predicts  that a country  will export  goods  whose  pro- 
duction  is intensive  in the use of primary  input  factors  with  which  it is rela- 
tively  well endowed,  and import  goods whose  production  intensively  uses 
factors  in which  it is relatively  poor. In the usual  two-goods,  two-factors, 
two-countries  models,  this dictum  means  simply  that a country  better  en- 
dowed  with  capital  than  with  labor  should  export  goods  whose  production 
is capital-intensive,  and import  goods that are labor-intensive.  Since the 
United  States  has a high  ratio  of capital  per  employee,  this  proposition  was 
generally  taken to mean that its exports  would be more capital-intensive 
than  its imports. 
This assumption  was refuted  by Leontief  in 1953,  when,  using  the 1947 
input-output  coefficients,  he showed that U.S. exports are less capital- 
intensive  in production  than are  the goods it imports.22  Leontief's  findings 
have  been  recently  confirmed  by Hufbauer  and  Baldwin,  who used  the 1963 
21. A cross-section  for only one year is used here because of data availability.  One 
obvious extension of this preliminary  study is to obtain cross-sections  for several  years 
spanning  a reasonably  long period. 
22. Wassily Leontief, "Domestic Production and Foreign Trade; the American 
Capital Position Re-examined,"  in Richard  E. Caves and Harry G. Johnson, Selection 
Committee, Readings  in International  Economics,  Vol.  11 (Richard D.  Irwin for the 
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input-output  coefficients,  and  Hufbauer  shows  that  they  also hold for man- 
ufactured  goods separately.23  Leontief's  paradoxical  findings  stimulated  a 
huge  output  of research.  Most of this  work  involved  first  articulating  all the 
assumptions  underlying  the Heckscher-Ohlin  result,  and  then  showing  that 
relaxing  one or more  of the assumptions  invalidated  the result.  Among  the 
key articles  in this  vast  literature  was one by Robinson,  which  critically  re- 
views  the two-input  factor  proportions  hypothesis,  and one by Vanek,  who 
studies  the natural  resource  content  of trade.24  Here  the focus is on the ex- 
planation,  initially  suggested  by Leontief  in his 1953  article  and  the subject 
of attention  recently,  that the usual two-factor  version  of the Heckscher- 
Ohlin  model  is too simple.  An analysis  of trade  in manufactured  goods  must 
be couched  in terms  of at least  three  inputs:  physical  capital,  human  capital, 
and  raw  (or uneducated)  labor.25  In this case,  the United  States,  because  of 
its higher  levels  of education  and  training,  may  be relatively  better  endowed 
with human  capital  than with physical  capital.  In a two-factor  model this 
situation  would  lead  to U.S. exports  of labor-intensive  goods;  a three-factor 
model might reveal  that the United States exports  goods that embody  a 
high amount  of human  capital  per  man. 
Since 1965,  work  on the human  capital  approach  to Leontief's  paradox 
has followed  two tracks.  One assumes  that, in a cross-  section,  wage  differ- 
entials  reflect  differences  in human  capital,  following  the spirit  of Kenen's 
article.  Thus  Bharadwaj  and  Bhagwati,  as well as Hufbauer,  find  a role  for 
wage  differentials  as representing  human  capital  in explaining  trade.26  The 
other  approach  attempts  to measure  differences  in human  capital  across  in- 
23. Hufbauer,  "Impact  of National  Characteristics,"  especially  pp. 168-70; Robert  E. 
Baldwin, "Determinants  of the Commodity  Structure  of U.S. Trade," American  Eco- 
nomic  Review,  Vol. 61 (March 1971),  pp. 126-46. 
24. See Romney Robinson, "Factor  Proportions  and Comparative  Advantage:  Part 
1," Quarterly  Journal  of Economics,  Vol. 70 (May 1956),  pp. 169-92; and Jaroslav  Vanek, 
The Natural  Resource  Content  of United  States Foreign  Trade,  1870-1955 (M.I.T. Press, 
1963). 
25. Leontief suggested  that the United States exports  labor-intensive  goods because 
its labor is more productive  than that abroad.  If this were so because  the United States 
is as rich in physical  capital  as in the two-factor  model, then his paradox  would not have 
appeared.  Rather, he implies that there is a third factor at work that also affects  (raw) 
labor productivity.  This third factor is human capital. The basic article developing  the 
role of human  capital  in trade  is Peter  B. Kenen, "Nature,  Capital,  and Trade,"  Journal 
of Political Economy,  Vol. 73 (October 1965), pp. 437-60. 
26. See Ranganath  Bharadwaj  and Jagdish  Bhagwati,  "Human  Capital  and the Pat- 
tern of Foreign  Trade: The Indian Case," Indian  Economic  Review,  Vol. 2, New Series 
(October 1967), pp.  117-42; and Hufbauer, "Impact of  National Characteristics," 
pp. 172-76. 324  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1971 
dustries  by proportions  of employees  in various  skill  classifications.  This  is 
the route  taken  recently  by Baldwin,  cited  above,  and  earlier  by Keesing.27 
In a recent  article,  Gruber  and  Vernon  use both kinds  of measures,  but on 
two separate  sets of data, so that they do not compare  their  relative  effec- 
tiveness  or discuss  their  relative  merits.28 
The first  approach  should  be preferable  if human  capital  is, in fact, re- 
flected  in earned  income.  If human  capital  is correctly  valued,  and  this  value 
accrues  as earned  income,  wage  differentials  should  fully  capture  the effects 
on productivity  of differences  in human  capital  per  person.  The  presence  of, 
say, a high  proportion  of scientists  in an industry  should  make  that a high- 
wage industry,  with the capitalized  value of the excess of that wage rate 
over  the wage  of an uneducated  person  measuring  the human  capital  input. 
In this event, the wage, or human  capital,  differential  should  capture  the 
contribution  of the input  of human  capital  to production,  or  to trade  advan- 
tage. Only if the scientists  contribute  something  extra,  in excess of their 
wage,  to production  should  a "skill  ratio"  of scientists  to total employees 
add  to the ability  of the human  capital  measure  to explain  variations  in out- 
put or trade  advantage. 
Thus if wage rates accurately  reflect  differences  in human  capital,  the 
capitalized  value  of the average  wage  above  the wage  of raw  labor  can  serve 
as a measure  of human  capital  in explaining  net exports.  If, in addition,  a 
skill ratio is significant,  it reveals  that the skilled  personnel  are,  in a sense, 
contributing  more  to comparative  advantage  than  their  market-determined 
wage  indicates, 
At the three-digit  SITC  level,  Hufbauer's  measure  of physical  capital  per 
man (K) was taken from Leontief's  base-line  1947  measures,  updated  by 
capital  expenditure  data  from  the Census  of Manufactures.  Hufbauer  calcu- 
lated  wages  per  man  by dividing  the wage  bill for 1963  (in 1963  dollars)  by 
total employees,  with data  from  the Census of Manufactures  for that year. 
Here,  human  capital  estimates  have  been  computed  by subtracting  the 1963 
value  of median  income  for persons  with  less than  eight  years  of education 
($2,500,  taken from the Current  Population Reports of the Bureau  of the 
Census)  from Hufbauer's  average  wage estimates,  and then capitalizing 
27. See Donald B. Keesing,  "Labor  Skills  and Comparative  Advantage,"  in American 
Economic Association,  Papers and Proceedings  of the Seventy-Eighth  Annual  Meeting, 
1965 (American  Economic  Review,  Vol. 56, May 1966),  pp. 249-58. 
28. See William H. Gruber and Raymond Vernon, "The Technology Factor in a 
World  Trade Matrix,"  in Vernon  (ed.), Technology  Factor  in International  Trade. William H. Branson and Helen B. Junz  325 
that  wage  differential  at a 10  percent  rate.  Thus  the human  capital  measure 
used  here  is 
-  Wi-2,500 
0.1 
where  W, is Hufbauer's  average  wage  in production  of commodity  i. 
At the two-digit  SITC  level,  Hufbauer  calculated  the ratio  (T) of profes- 
sional,  technical,  and scientific  personnel  to total personnel  in each  indus- 
try, using  the 1960 Census  as his source  of basic data. The analysis  here 
examines  the data at the three-digit  level,  then aggregates  to the two-digit 
level  and  introduces  the skill  ratio,  T, to assess  its significance  in explaining 
variations  in net exports  across  commodities  independently  of the human 
capital  measure,  H. In the work  of Keesing  and  of Baldwin,  cited  earlier,  the 
skill distribution  of employment  was significant  in explaining  trade pat- 
terns.  But neither  Keesing  nor Baldwin  introduced  a measure  of wages  or 
human  capital  into the same  equation. 
Scale economies.  In addition  to physical  and human  capital  per man, a 
measure  of economies  of scale  in production  within  industries  is tested  for 
significance  in explaining  the pattern  of U.S. trade.  Basically  the scale  econ- 
omy  hypothesis  suggests  that  with  a large  domestic  market,  U.S. producers 
can obtain the cost-reducing  advantages  of large production  runs more 
readily  than  can  producers  in smaller  markets.  Thus  the United  States  may 
have  a price  advantage  in goods  whose  production  entails  significant  econ- 
omies of scale and these  might  be expected  to show relatively  large  trade 
surpluses,  holding  other  factors  constant. 
Hufbauer  calculated  a measure  of scale  economies  by  relating  value  added 
per employee  to the number  of employees  across  size classes  of establish- 
ments  within  three-digit  SITC  categories.  For  each  SITC  category,  Hufbauer 
estimated  the equation 
=  aN1, 
where 
qi = value added  per employee  in establishmentj 
q = average  value added  per man in the SITC  category 
N1 = number  of employees  in establishment] 
S = scale  economy  measure  for  production  of that  SITC  commodity 
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A value  of S of 0.1, for example,  means  that doubling  establishment  size- 
measured  by employment-raises value added per man by 10 percent. 
These S values  are  the measure  of economies  of scale; in general  they run 
from -0.05  to +0.15. 
The  Vernon  product  cycle. Another  variable  tested  for its influence  on in- 
ternational  trade  is a rather  imperfect  measure  designed  to reflect  the prod- 
uct cycle hypothesis.  As noted above, it states  that the United States, as 
the country  with highest  income  per capita  and wage rates, should  typi- 
cally export  manufactured  goods  that are in the early  stage  of the product 
cycle,  and import  goods  that are  in later  stages.  One  measure  of the "age" 
of a good that is particularly  appropriate  as a proxy  for the product  cycle 
is the date  at which  it first  entered  international  trade.  The earlier  the date, 
the older  the good, in the sense  that is relevant  here. 
Starting  with 1909,  when  the U.S. Census  Bureau's  export  classification 
list, Schedule  B, was  first  published,  Hufbauer  found  the date  at which  each 
seven-digit  SITC category  first appeared  in the export  schedule.  He then 
averaged  these dates  within  three-digit  categories  to arrive  at a first-trade 
date  (in years  and  tenths  of years-for example,  1947.8)  at that  level. These 
data serve  as a (clearly  imperfect)  proxy  (P) for the product  cycle.29 
Research and development  expenditures. Closely related to the  product 
cycle  hypothesis  and  to the human  capital  explanation  of U.S. comparative 
advantage,  especially  in its skill  ratio  variant,  is the research  and develop- 
ment  (R&D)  explanation  of U.S. trade  advantage.  In a 1967  article  Keesing 
noted  the relationship  of R&D  expenditures,  as a percent  of value  added,  to 
net exports  by industry.30  This finding  could supplement  both the human 
capital  and  product  cycle  hypotheses:  A firm  with  a high  R&D ratio  prob- 
ably employs  more  than the average  number  of scientists  and technicians, 
who in turn  are  paid wages  above  the average.  Thus  research-intensive  in- 
dustries  would  be human-capital-intensive  industries  as well. 
29. An obvious question may be raised concerning  Hufbauer's  use of U.S. export 
data alone to measure  first-trade  dates. If the product cycle hypothesis  does not hold 
in general,  the first  date of U.S. export  of a commodity  is not likely to pinpoint  the date 
when the good entered  international  trade. But in that event the variable  P should not 
significantly  improve the explanation of variations of U.S. net exports in the cross- 
section. On the other hand, if the product cycle hypothesis  does hold, the U.S. first- 
export dates should be a good approximation  to dates of first  international  trading  and 
P should be significant. 
30. See Donald B. Keesing, "The Impact of Research  and Development  on United 
States Trade,"  Journal  of Political Economy,  Vol. 75 (February  1967), pp. 38-48. William H. Branson and Helen B. Junz  327 
At this point the R&D explanation  blends  into the skill ratio case.31  If 
such  expenditures  are only a proxy  for human  capital,  the inclusion  of an 
R&D measure  along  with human  capital  in a regression  equation  explain- 
ing net exports  should  not significantly  improve  the explanation. 
But  research  expenditures  also fit into the product  cycle  hypothesis.  Pre- 
sumably  the production  of new consumer  and capital  goods involves,  on 
the average,  a greater  R&D ratio than does the production  of mature, 
standardized  goods.  If the product  cycle  hypothesis  is correct,  then  produc- 
tion of goods  in which  the United  States  has a trade  surplus  should  involve 
higher  research  ratios  than  does  production  of goods  with  net  trade  deficits. 
Keesing's  data  on R&D ratios  for 1960  are  used  to observe  the relation- 
ship  of the cross-section  of U.S. net exports,  by SITC  commodity,  to R&D 
expenditures.32  As a function  of value  added  in production,  the values  run 
from  0.01  to a high  of 0.24 for office  machinery.  Their  use  narrows  the sam- 
ple to sixty-one  three-digit  SITC categories  to which  R&D ratios  can be 
assigned. 
ANALYSIS  OF THREE-DIGIT  SITC  DATA 
Simple  correlation  coefficients  between  the three-digit  cross-section  vari- 
ables are shown  in the correlation  matrix  of Table  8. The first  column  re- 
veals that net exports  (X) have a small  negative  correlation  with physical 
capital  per  man  (K), and  larger  positive  correlations  with  human  capital  per 
man (H), scale  economies  (S), and  the first-trade  date  (P). The second  col- 
umn  demonstrates  that  physical  and  human  capital  are  fairly  strongly  cor- 
related,  while  physical  capital  per  man  has a negative  correlation  with  scale 
economies.  Human  capital  per man is weakly  correlated  with scale econ- 
omies,  according  to the data  in the third  column. 
The positive  correlation  across  commodities  between  human  and physi- 
cal capital  per man, taken  by itself,  would  be consistent  with a two-input 
production  model.  In this  case  one  would  argue  that,  across  industries,  high 
ratios  of capital  per man  lead  to high  wage  rates  and  high estimates  of hu- 
man  capital.  But,  since  the United  States  has a high  ratio  of capital  per  man 
in the  entire  economy  relative  to other  countries,  this  two-input  model  would 
31. In fact, both Gruber and Vernon, "Technology  Factor," and Baldwin, "De- 
terminants  of the Commodity  Structure  of U.S. Trade,"  use skill ratios to measure  the 
technology intensity  of production. 
32. See Keesing, "Impact  of Research  and Development,"  App. 2, p. 47. 328  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1971 
Table  8. Correlations  of U.S. Net Exports  and  Selected  Production 
Characteristics,  Manufactured  Goods,  by Three-digit  SITC 
Commodity  Groups, 1964a 
Net  Physical  Human  Scale  First-trade 
exports  capital  capital  economies  date 
Variable  (X)  (K)  (H)  (S)  (P) 
Net exports  (X)  1.000  -0.085  0.214  0.204  0.216 
Physical  capital (K)  -0.085  1.000  0.591  -0.227  0.118 
Human capital (H)  0.214  0.591  1.000  0.069  0.245 
Scale economies (S)  0.204  -0.227  0.069  1.000  -0.065 
Firsttradedate(P)  0.216  0.118  0.245  -0.065  1.000 
Sources: Based on data developed by G. C. Hufbauer, "The Impact of National  Characteristics and 
Technology on the Commodity Composition of Trade in Manufactured  Goods," in Raymond Vernon (ed.), 
The Technology  Factor in International  Trade,  A Conference of the Universities-National Bureau Committee 
for Economic Research (Columbia University Press for the National Bureau of Economic Research, 1970), 
especially Table A-2; and on median income data from U.S.  Bureau of the Census, Current  Population 
Reports, Series P-60, No.  43, "Income of Families and Persons in the United States: 1963" (1964). 
a.  Standard international trade classification groups 5-8. 
mean  that (a) U.S. net exports  should  be physical-capital-intensive  goods; 
(b) X and K thus should  be positively  correlated,  and (c) X and H would 
also be positively  correlated,  but only because  high K causes  both high X 
and high H. 
This set of implications  of a two-input  model  is clearly  inconsistent  with 
Table  8, in which  a negative  (but very  small)  correlation  appears  between 
physical  capital  and  net exports.  A more  consistent  story  can be told with  a 
three-input  model:  Industries  producing  with  high  ratios  of physical  capital 
per man (raw labor), relative  to other domestic  industries,  also use high 
ratios of human  capital  per man, which  leads  to high average  wage  rates. 
This could account  for the 0.59 correlation  between  human  and physical 
capital.  But, as Leontief  suggested  long ago, while  the U.S. economy  has a 
high  ratio of physical  capital  per  man,  relative  to other  countries,  it is even 
better  situated  with respect  to human  capital  per man, so that its net ex- 
ports  are  intensive  in the latter,  as Table  8 suggests. 
These  impressions  from  the simple  correlation  matrix  are supported  by 
the regression  analysis  relating  net exports  to the four production  charac- 
teristics,  K, H, S, and  p.33 These  results  are summarized  in Table  9, which 
33. Multiple  regression  is used here strictly  as a descriptive  device; it shows the rela- 
tionship of the cross-section  of net exports  to the production  characteristics  in this set 
of data. To show the regression  coefficients  in the following tables is not, however,  to 
imply that they can be used as partial derivatives,  or policy multipliers.  Rather, the 
point is to see whether  net exports are positively or negatively  related to the various 
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Table  9. Cross-section  Regressions  Explaining  U.S. Net Exports  of 
Manufactured  Goods,  by Three-digit  SITC Commodity  Groups 
Coefficients  of independent  variables 
Physical  Human 
capital  capital  Scale  First- 
per man  per man  economies  trade  Summary 
Equation  and  (K)  (H)  measure  date  statistics 
dependent  (thousands  (thousands  (S)  (P) 
variables  of dollars)  of dollars)  (percent)  (year)  R2  Fb 
9-1, 1964  net  -8.63  81.82  3.44  9.22  0.21  6.65 
exports  (2.7)  (3.1)  (1.3)  (2.3) 
9-2, 1964net  ...  37.73  5.88  9.91  0.15  5.92 
exports  (1.8)  (2.3)  (2.4) 
9-3, 1964 net  -2.42  ...  5.74  12.17  0.13  5.02 
exports  (0.9)  (2.2)  (3.0) 
9-4, 1964net  -10.23  102.90  ...  ...  0.16  9.73 
exports  (3.3)  (4.1) 
9-5, 1967 net  -9.24  95.13  4.26  9.29  0.19  5.86 
exports  (2.5)  (3.1)  (1.4)  (2.0) 
9-6, 1964 gross 
exports  divided  by 
sum of 1964 
exports  and  -1.08  11.84  0.25  0.90  0.26  8.43 
imports  (3.2)  (4.3)  (0.9)  (2.1) 
Mean  value  of variable  12.2  4.3  3.1  1945.2 
Sources: Same as Table 8. 
Note: Here and in subsequent tables, figures in parentheses  are t-statistics. 
a.  The dependent variable in equations 9-1 through 9-5 is expressed in millions; in equation 9-6, it is in 
percent. Its mean is $74.8 million for 9-1 through 9-4, $50.2 million for 9-5, and 56.7 percent for 9-6. 
b.  With 101 observations and four independent variables, the F statistic must be above 2.46 to be signifi- 
cant at the 5 percent confidence level and 3.51 to be significant at the 1 percent level. 
displays  the coefficients  of the four variables,  with their t-ratios  in paren- 
theses,  in several  regressions  explaining  variations  in net exports.34  Equa- 
34. The regression  equation across commodities  i (i  = 1,...  ,  101) is 
Xi  =  ao +  alKi  +  a2Hi +  aaS1 +  a4Pi  +  ei, 
where  the coefficients  a,  . . . , a4 are shown in Table 9, along with their t-statistics.  The 
constant  term  ao is simply  the difference  between  the mean Xi and the sum of the means 
of Ki, Hi, Si, and Pi, each multiplied  by the relevant  a, and is of no particular  interest 
here. This form of equation is traditional  in the literature.  See, for example,  Baldwin, 
"Determinants  of Commodity Structure."  The equation is not fully consistent with a 
three-factor  production  model, which would suggest deflating  net exports by employ- 
ment in each commodity  group. Failure  to deflate  in this way may lend undue weight 
to industries  that have large trade  flows due to size of industry  alone. Inefficient  param- 
eter estimates  may result. But at this time data on neither  employment  nor output by 330  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1971 
tion 9-1 shows  the coefficients  of the explanatory  variables  when  the full  set 
is included.  Human  capital  per man has a positive  and significant  coeffi- 
cient,  while  physical  capital  per  man  has a significantly  negative  coefficient. 
While  K and  H are  positively  correlated  across  industries,  as human  capital 
increases  (holding  K, S, and  P constant  across  commodities)  net exports  in- 
crease,  while  the opposite  is true  if H is constant  and  K increases.  Thus  in- 
dustries  with large  export  surpluses  seem  to use a large  amount  of human 
capital  relative  to physical  capital  (or to have high wage rates  relative  to 
their  physical  capital-labor  ratios).35 
The  next  two equations  in Table  9 show,  respectively,  what  happens  when 
physical  or human  capital  is dropped  from the equation.  Since they are 
positively  correlated,  but work in different  directions  on net exports,  the 
omission  of one of them,  which  requires  the other  to represent  both,  reduces 
the size of the coefficient  of the included  variable. 
In equation  9-1 the product  cycle  variable  P is marginally  significant.  All 
other things constant,  newer  products  (in terms of first-trade  dates) will 
SITC commodities are available. Furthermore,  as noted above, these results are not 
especially new, but simply consolidate past studies that use the form shown here. A 
more rigorous specification  of the correct  equation for exploring  the sources of com- 
parative  advantage,  and collection of the data required  to estimate that equation, is 
clearly  the next step after  the purely  descriptive  initial  regressions  shown in Tables  9, 10, 
and 11. In response  to suggestions  from the panel that some form of scale variable  be 
added to the analysis,  the basic regression  was also run with the ratio of gross exports 
to gross trade as the dependent  variable.  This variable  is bounded by zero and unity. 
The results,  shown as equation  9-6 in Table 9, do not differ  appreciably  from the basic 
results  reported  below. 
35. A further  technical  point is brought out by the regressions  of Table 9: Trade 
surpluses across commodities are positively related to human capital per man and 
negatively  related  to physical  capital per man in production.  Thus it would make little 
sense to add together  human  and physical  capital in explaining  trade patterns.  In fact, 
if this is done, and equation 9-1 is rerun  with "total capital,"  R2 falls to 0.12 and the 
"total capital"  coefficient  has a t-ratio of 0.6. 
These results suggest that human and physical  capital are not perfect  substitutes  in 
production  and cannot be summed simply to "total capital." This is contrary  to the 
suggestion  by Kenen to use precisely  that method to demonstrate  that U.S. trade is 
capital  intensive,  after  all. See Kenen, "Nature,  Capital,  and Trade,"  p. 457. This rescue 
of the two-factor  model has also been hinted at in Harry G. Johnson, "The State of 
Theory in Relation to the Empirical  Analysis," in Vernon (ed.), Technology  Factor  in 
International  Trade,  p. 14. It is also implicit  in Lary's  use of value added per man as a 
measure  of capital intensity.  Value added is simply profits  plus wages, so value added 
per man is physical plus human capital per man times a common discount rate. See 
Hal B. Lary, Imports  of Manufactures  from Less Developed  Countries  (Columbia  Uni- 
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show  larger  surpluses.  This is consistent  with  the product  cycle  hypothesis 
for U.S. trade,  and suggests  that it is visible  at the three-digit  SITC  level. 
This evidence,  combined  with the earlier  observations  on the long-term 
OBE  end-use  data,  confirms  the product  cycle as a fairly  good general  de- 
scription  of the life of products  in trade  in manufactured  goods. 
The scale economy  variable  is marginally  insignificant  in equation  9-1. 
Industries  that exhibit  scale  economies  (again,  all other  things  equal)  may 
have  larger  surpluses  than  those  that  do not, but  the evidence  is faint.  When 
both S and  P are eliminated  from  the equation  (equation  9-4), the signifi- 
cance  of the basic  physical  and  human  capital  variables  is increased.  Thus 
the three-factor  version  of the classical  trade  model may serve  as a good 
basic  description  of the source  of U.S. comparative  advantage  in trade  in 
manufactured  goods. 
According  to equation  9-5, the basic  results  are  not particularly  sensitive 
to choice  of year  for the trade  data.  The  measurements  for the independent 
variables  are  taken  from  various  years  in the period  1960-65,  and  they re- 
late in similar  ways  to U.S. trade  data  for any of the years  1964-68.  These 
are  fundamental  relationships  of trade  advantage,  and  they are  unlikely  to 
change  very  rapidly  over  time.36 
Finally,  the introduction  in equation  9-6 of a scaled  version  of the de- 
pendent  variable,  exports  divided  by the sum of exports  and imports,  im- 
proves  the results  somewhat,  raising  R2 and the t-ratios  of human and 
physical  capital.  Thus there appears  to be no reason  to assume  that the 
basic results  of equations  9-1 and 9-4 are changed  substantially  by this 
modification. 
THE  ROLE OF  R&D  EXPENDITURES 
Narrowing  the three-digit  sample  from 101 to 61 commodities  permits 
introduction  of Keesing's  1960  R&D expenditure  ratios  into the analysis. 
The simple  correlations  of the ratios of R&D expenditure  to total value 
added  (RD) with  the other  variables  introduced  in the previous  section  are 
as follows: 
X  K  H  S  P 
0.43  -0.10  0.15  0.26  0.14 
36. When  the equations  are reestimated  excluding  SITC category  68, which  is mainly 
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There  is a high  correlation  of the R&D ratio  with  net exports  in the sample. 
RD is negatively  correlated  with physical  capital  per  man  K and positively 
correlated  with  the scale economies  measure  S. This is consistent  with the 
evidence  on the full 101-commodity  sample  in Table  8, which  indicates  that 
K and S are  negatively  correlated,  The RD variable  is positively  correlated 
with  both  the human  capital  measure  H and  the first-trade  date  measure  of 
the product  cycle  P, and  the strength  of the correlations  is about  the same. 
Thus  R&D-intensive  industries  do tend  to have  wage  rates  above the aver- 
age and  to produce  relatively  new  products. 
In Table  10,  which  follows  the format  of Table  9, the  R&D variable  is in- 
troduced  into  the regression  analysis  in two steps:  First,  with  a 61-observa- 
tion subsample,  equations  10-1  and 10-2  reestimate  the basic  equations  9-1 
Table 10.  Cross-section Regressions Explaining U.S. Net Exports of 
Manufactured  Goods, Including  Research and Development  Expenditures 
as an Explanatory Variable, by Three-digit SITC Commodity Groups, 
1964 
Coefficients  of independent  variables 
Ratio of 
research 
Physical  Human  and de- 
capital  capital  velopment 
per man  per man  Scale  First-  expendi- 
(K)  (H)  economies  trade  tures  to value 
(thou-  (thou-  measure  date  added,  1960  Summary  statistics 
sands  of  sands  of  (S)  (P)  (RD) 
Equation"  dollars)  dollars)  (percent)  (year)  (percent)  R2  Fb 
10-1  -9.92  84.70  2.24  17.21  ...  0.29  5.72 
(2.5)  (1.7)  (2.6)  (1.9) 
10-2  -12.99  127.95  ...  ...  ...  0.16  5.53 
(4.1)  (2.5) 
10-3  -8.47  60.23  4.75  15.71  21.22  0.37  6.45 
(2.2)  (1.3)  (1.2)  (2.5)  (2.7) 
10-4  -10.47  92.79  ...  ...  25.15  0.28  7.39 
(2.6)  (1.9)  (3.1) 
Mean value 
of variable  12.2  4.3  3.1  1945.2  3.37  ...  ... 
Sources: Same as Table 8, and, for research  and development variable, Donald B. Keesing, "The Impact 
of Research and Development on United States Trade," Journal of Politkcal  Economy, Vol. 75 (February 
1967), pp. 38-48. 
a.  The dependent variable is 1964 exports; its mean is $74.8 million. 
b.  With sixty-one observations and four independent variables, the F statistic must be above 2.52 to be 
significant  at the 5 percent level and 3.65 to be significant at the 1 percent level. William  H. Branson  and  Helen  B. Junz  333 
and 9-4, respectively.  A comparison  of the pairs  of equations  reveals  that 
restricting  the sample  moderately  changes  the size and  significance  of some 
coefficients,  as would  be expected. 
Next, in equations  10-3  and 10-4,  RD is added  to equations  10-1  and 10-2, 
respectively.  In both  equations  the coefficient  of RD is quite  significant,  the 
fit of the equation  is increased  substantially,  and  the significance  of both  the 
human  and  physical  capital  measures  is reduced.  The comparison  of equa- 
tions 10-1  and 10-3  suggests  that introduction  of R&D spending  increases 
the significance  of the product  cycle  measure  and  reduces  that of the scale 
economies  measure. 
The  most interesting  result  here  is that  the R&D measure  is a significant 
variable  in explaining  variations  in net exports  of manufactured  goods  even 
when variations  in human capital have been accounted  for. This result 
comes  in a subsample  that is, in a sense,  biased  against  the human  capital 
explanation  of U.S. comparative  advantage.  But  it does appear  that  the  role 
of the R&D expenditure  ratio  in explaining  U.S. comparative  advantage  is 
not simply  that of a proxy  for human  capital  or for the product  cycle. 
ANALYSIS  OF THE  SKILL  RATIO 
The skill  ratio T can enter  the analysis  at the two-digit  SITC  level  to re- 
veal  whether  this  source  of variation  in average  wage  rates  across  industries 
adds  to the explanation  of net exports  once  human  capital,  in general,  is in- 
cluded  in the equation.  Table  11 displays  the results  of this addition. 
Equation 11-1 simply  reestimates  equation  9-1 on the two-digit  data, 
yielding only twenty-eight  observations.  The results are essentially  the 
same,  although  aggregation  tends  to blur  the analysis,  reducing  the signif- 
icance  of all the coefficients.37  The entire  equation  does not explain  a sta- 
tistically  significant  fraction  of the variation  in net exports  at the two-digit 
level. Thus equation 11-2 eliminates  S and P, raising  the significance  of 
physical  and  human  capital. 
The  next  two equations  show  the results  of adding  the skill  ratio T to the 
equation  and excluding  the scale  economies  and first-trade  date  variables. 
In equation  11-3  T substitutes  for human  capital.  This  results  in a drop  in 
37. Note that, in aggregating,  three-digit  net export data have been summed  to the 
two-digit  level, while  the three-digit  data on the explanatory  variables  were averaged  by 
Hufbauer,  using 1965  exports  as weights.  Thus the Table 11 coefficients  are larger  than 
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Table  11. Cross-section  Regressions  Explaining  U.S. Net Exports  of 
Manufactured  Goods,  Including  the Skill Ratio  as an Explanatory  Variable, 
by Two-digit  SITC Commodity  Groups,  1964a 
Coefficients  of independent  variables 
Ratio of 
professional, 
Physical  Human  scientific, 
capital  capital  and 
per man  per man  Scale  First-  technical 
(K)  (H)  economies  trade  employees 
(thou-  (thou-  measure  date  to total  Summary  statistics 
sands  of  sands  of  (S)  (P)  (T) 
Equation  dollars)  dollars)  (percent)  (year)  (percent)  R2  Fb 
11-1  -55.71  39.01  27.52  28.96  ...  0.33  3.00 
(2.4)  (2.1)  (1. 0)  (1.1) 
11-2  -60.34  50.39  ...  ...  ...  0.28  5.05 
(2.6)  (3.0) 
11-3  -31.59  ...  ...  ...  60.77  0.15  2.30 
(1.5)  (2.0) 
11-4  -61.74  42.85  ...  ...  25.74  0.30  3.57 
(2.6)  (2.2)  (0.8) 
Mean value 
of variable  12.2  4.1  4.2  1944.5  9.0 
Sources: Same as Table 8, and for the skill ratio variable, data from U.S.  Bureau of the Census, U.S. 
Census of Population: 1960, Subject Reports, Occupation  by Industry,  Final Report PC(2)-7C (1963). 
a.  The dependent variable is 1964 exports; its mean is $270.2 million. 
b.  With twenty-eight observations, the 5 percent levels of F are as follows: 
Number of independent  variables 
2  3  4  5 
3.37  2.99  2.78  2.64 
the explanatory  power  of the entire  regression  and T is less significant  in 
11-3  than H is in 11-2.  When  human  capital  and  the skill  ratio  are  allowed 
to compete  directly  in equation  11-4,  H is significant,  while  T has a t-ratio 
of only  0.8. Thus,  as far as the two-digit  data  reveal,  once  human  capital  in 
general,  as reflected  by high wage rates  (relative  to the base wage for un- 
educated  labor),  is entered  into  the explanation  of net exports,  the inclusion 
of the skill  ratio  does not improve  the explanation, 
Summary  and  Conclusions 
This paper  reports  an attempt  to draw  various  strands  of information 
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As such,  it is mainly  descriptive,  not analytical.  The effort  has been  to de- 
scribe  past patterns  with a minimum  application  of implicit  theory,  rather 
than to explain  them in any detailed  way or to provide  a mechanism  for 
predicting  future  trends. 
TRENDS  IN  U.S.  TRADE 
Before  World  War II, from 1925  to 1937  or so, the United States  gen- 
erally  had surpluses  in trade  in capital  goods, automotive  products,  fuels 
and lubricants,  and iron and steel products.  Deficits  typically  appeared  in 
consumer  goods, textiles, and industrial  materials  based on natural  re- 
sources,  such  as primary  metals  and  wood  products.  Trade  in chemicals  was 
roughly  balanced.  These  surpluses  and deficits  did not show major  trends 
nor did  trade  of commodity  groups  at this  level  of aggregation  fluctuate  be- 
tween  surplus  and deficit. 
The  period  1946-49  witnessed  a great  expansion  in U.S. exports,  virtually 
across  the board,  while  imports  remained  initially  at prewar  levels.  By the 
middle  or late 1950s,  the temporary  surpluses  had disappeared,  and a new 
set of trends  emerged.  In no case  did  trade  revert  to the stable  pattern  of the 
1925-37  period.  Rather,  rapid  change  dominated  the pattern,  with  growing 
surpluses  in capital  goods and chemicals,  growing  deficits  in other  indus- 
trial  supplies  and  materials,  and  a shrinking  surplus  turning  into a growing 
deficit  in consumer  goods. 
The  net  result  of all  this  movement  in commodity  trade  balances  is shown 
in Table  1 as the total balance  on trade.  Once  the postwar  bulge  was elimi- 
nated,  the trade  surplus  grew  erratically  to 1964.  The excess  demand  of the 
late 1960s  obscured  the trend  of fast-growing  surpluses  in capital  goods  and 
substantially  increased  the deficit  in durable  consumer  goods.  But  while  ag- 
gregate  demand  factors  were  important  in the  late 1960s,  a structural  move- 
ment  underlies  the changing  U.S. trade  position,  operating  independently 
of the state  of aggregate  demand. 
THE BASIS  FOR  U.S.  COMPARATIVE  ADVANTAGE 
The results  reported  here  suggest  that U.S. net exports  are  not intensive 
in physical  capital.  This  conclusion  is by now commonplace.  Net exports  of 
the United States  seem to be intensive  in human  capital,  as measured  by 
average  wage differentials  across  commodity  production,  and to be posi- 336  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1971 
tively related  to expenditures  on research  and development  across  indus- 
tries.  In addition,  the Vernon  product  cycle  appears  in both  the analysis  of 
trade by four-digit  OBE end-use  categories  and the cross-section  regres- 
sions on three-digit  SITC  categories,  reported  above. 
IMPLICATIONS  FOR  TRADE  POLICY 
The  analysis  of U.S. trade,  taken  by itself,  permits  no definitive  statement 
about  what  policy  should  be followed.  If the subject  is balance-of-payments 
policy,  the appropriate  trade  balance  can  be determined  only  in light  of de- 
cisions  on the overall  balance  of payments  and  its composition.  Even  with 
a trade  deficit,  the United  States  might  run  a substantial  surplus  on current 
account  with  net  income  on investment  and  other  services.  In 1970  the U.S. 
trade  surplus  was $2.1  billion  (including  military  items,  which  are  excluded 
from Table 1), while the surplus  on investment  income  was $6.2 billion. 
Thus  a current  account  surplus  that  finances  a capital  account  deficit  can be 
consistent  with  a small  trade  surplus  or deficit.38 
On the other  hand, if the subject  is policy concerning  employment  and 
the composition  of industrial  output,  trade  policy  cannot  be fixed  without 
decisions  on the level and  distribution  of output  and employment  in gen- 
eral.  The United States  should  not look to trade  to achieve  high levels of 
employment:  Suitable  policies  regarding  aggregate  demand  are capable  of 
maintaining  full employment.  And it is hard  to see why particular  indus- 
tries  that are  suffering  from  competition  should  be aided  if the competitors 
are foreign,  but not if they are domestic.  Foreign  competition  is only one 
reason-and a minor one, at that-why  industries  that were once strong 
die out. 
This analysis  does, however,  throw  light on the current  problem  of ex- 
change  rates.  The  tendency  for imports  to supply  an increasing  share  of the 
U.S. domestic  market  is explained  largely  by the fact  that  trade  has  become 
more dynamic  in the postwar  world. Consumption  everywhere  is more 
cosmopolitan  and this development  must  be recognized  in any analysis  of 
trade  positions.  As noted  before,  the United States  is highly  self-sufficient 
38. The growing  role of investment  income in the current  account has been empha- 
sized recently by Lawrence  B. Krause, who suggests that the United States may be 
shifting  from the role of an exporter  of goods to that of an exporter  of capital  services. 
See Lawrence  B. Krause, "Trade  Policy for the Seventies,"  Columbia  Journal  of World 
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in the supply  of finished  goods.  In today's  world  this fact alone  might  tend 
to attract  foreign  competitors  eager  to increase  import  penetration  of the 
U.S. domestic  market.  But,  through  1968,  the  U.S. degree  of self-sufficiency 
fell almost  exactly  in line with the decline  in that of other  industrial  coun- 
tries. 
Since 1968,  however,  the share  of the domestic  market  supplied  by for- 
eign sources  has probably  grown  rather  faster in the United States  than 
elsewhere.  In part,  the inflation  of the late 1960s  is responsible.  Although 
excess  demand  has disappeared,  relative  price  positions  today reflect  the 
changes  of the past  five  years,  and  the rate  of inflation  in the United  States 
has not yet moderated  sufficiently  to bring  about  significant  improvement 
in this  situation. 
The differential  movements  in price  positions  over  the past few years  by 
themselves  point to the need for some exchange  rate adjustments.  But the 
fact  that  the current  exchange  rate  structure  still  reflects  vestiges  of the early 
postwar  distortions  in competitive  positions  and industrial  potential  sup- 
ports the need for more far-reaching  adjustments.  Indeed,  the events of 
late summer 1971 demonstrated  clearly the extent of the existing dis- 
equilibria. 
Furthermore,  if exchange  rate adjustments  are  to be used  to maintain  a 
given  long-run  trade  balance  in a world  of growing  surpluses  and deficits, 
they probably  will have to be frequent.  Before  World  War II, with static 
balances,  a one-time  change  in rates  might  have  yielded  the desired  change 
in the trade  balance.  But  in a more  dynamic  world,  "equilibrium"  rates  will 
be continuously  changing,  so that  actual  parity  changes  will  have  to be made 
with  some  frequency. 
Moreover,  this study  can suggest  what kinds of policies  might  work, if 
a prior  decision  to "do something"  concerning  the trade  balance  is taken. 
Given  the already  numerous  trade  restrictions  that exist,  U.S. trade  policy 
should  aim at increasing  exports,  not at protecting  or subsidizing  domestic 
import-competing  industries,  a course  that can be followed  only at the ex- 
pense  of the welfare  of U.S. consumers.  Exaggerating  somewhat  from  the 
findings  on the sources  of U.S. comparative  advantage,  one might  say that 
the United States  does not export  mass-produced,  physical-capital-inten- 
sive  goods;  it exports  custom-made,  human-capital-intensive  goods.  Thus  a 
policy undertaken  by the United States to improve  its trade advantage 
ought  to focus  on increasing  the  input  of human  capital  into the  production 
process  by promoting  a more  highly  skilled  labor  force  and improving  its 338  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1971 
distribution,  and  perhaps  by encouraging  more  expenditure  in research  and 
development.  The results would tend to improve export performance, 
which is the proper  objective  for U.S. trade policy in today's  world.  To 
attempt  to insulate  the country  from  the natural  trend  toward  expanding 
trade among all industrial  countries  would not be in the interest  of the 
United States. Comments  and 
Discussion 
R. A. Gordon:  This paper  deals  with two separate  but related  topics. The 
first is concerned  with long-term  trends  in foreign  trade. Here the time 
dimension  is important  and the authors  look at the entire spectrum  of 
trade.  In the second,  the authors  search  for the sources  of this country's 
comparative  advantage  in foreign  trade. The analysis  of that portion is 
entirely  cross-sectional,  and is limited  to trade in manufactures;  it is en- 
lightening  and  makes  a contribution,  but I regret  its lack of a time dimen- 
sion. The authors  have put their fingers  on at least some of the major 
sources  of comparative  advantage  in American  foreign  trade  in manufac- 
tures  in the 1960s,  but what  have  been  the major  changes  over  the last half- 
century,  and what  do these changes  portend  for the future? 
In their  historical  analysis  of trends  in net exports  since  1925,  the authors 
utilize the end-use  classification  developed  by the Department  of Com- 
merce.  I am not sure  that this is the best classification  for their  purposes. 
If our  chief  concern  is with  the changing  competitive  position  of the Ameri- 
can economy  in world  trade,  characteristics  of the production  process  and 
the market  for inputs,  not end uses, are the essential  bases  for classifying 
exports  and  imports.  The  authors  recognize  this  in their  subsequent  analysis 
of the source  of comparative  advantage. 
Table 1 of the paper deserves  careful  study. Of the groupings  shown 
there, only in chemicals  and capital  goods, as was pointed out, has the 
United States  had a growing  export  surplus  since  the early  fifties.  Among 
the other  categories,  the  chief  differences  are  in the amount  of the deteriora- 
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tion and  when  it began.  In the recent  deterioration,  an outstanding  element 
is the decline  in net exports  of consumer  goods of approximately  $3.9 bil- 
lion. This component  is far more important  than the $1.2 billion drop in 
net agricultural  exports,  which the authors  emphasize.  In contrast,  the 
rapid  increase  in net exports  of capital  goods  has not decelerated.  That  ex- 
port  surplus  in 1970  was nearly  enough  to balance  the total import  surplus 
in those categories  that show  trade  deficits. 
The second section of the paper,  comparing  domestic  output and ex- 
penditures  in foreign  trade  among  the various  industrial  countries,  covers 
ground  that is largely  familiar.  Although  the authors  combine  the figures 
in a different  way,  they  offer  little  that  is new.  While  the method  of analysis 
in that section  leaves  much  to be desired,  I accept  the conclusion  that the 
American  boom of the late sixties  explains  only a part  of the deterioration 
of our trade  balance  during  that period.  In view of the highly  simplified 
treatment,  however,  I have  no confidence  in their  quantitative  estimates  of 
the actual  effect.  Among  the factors  ignored  or slighted  are  relative  prices, 
income  elasticities,  and the nature  of underlying  structural  changes. 
In the authors'  comparative  analysis,  I missed  any  use of trade  matrices, 
particularly  trade  matrices  over  time by broad  commodity  groups  such as 
the International  Monetary  Fund  is developing  for its own use and  for the 
LINK project,  which seeks to connect  the econometric  models of major 
countries. 
On the whole,  I have  little quarrel  with  the last part  of the paper  which 
deals  with the sources  of comparative  advantage  in manufactured  goods. 
In general,  I accept  the conclusions  as valid  with respect  to the very  short 
interval  of time  that is covered.  The authors  look for the sources  of Ameri- 
ca's comparative  advantage  in manufacturing,  particularly  capital  goods 
and chemicals,  in terms  of the following  factors:  capital-labor  ratios, in- 
vestment  in human  capital,  economies  of scale,  the product  cycle,  research 
and development  expenditures,  and the ratio of highly  skilled  workers  to 
total employment.  They  regress  net manufacturing  exports  by commodity 
groups  on various  combinations  of these  variables.  The  results  confirm  both 
the Leontief  paradox  and his explanation  for it, in emphasizing  the im- 
portance  of human  capital  as a source  of U.S. comparative  advantage.  The 
authors  encounter  problems  of getting  appropriate  measures  of the varia- 
bles  they  want  to use, and  they  wind  up explaining  a rather  low proportion 
of the variation  in net exports  among  commodities.  But the evidence  does 
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factured  goods tends  to be associated  with relatively  heavy  investment  in 
human  capital,  research  and  development  expenditures,  and  the age of the 
industries  concerned. 
Finally,  to return  to the issue I raised  earlier  about the lack of a time 
dimension  in the study of comparative  advantage,  I am reminded  of Ed- 
ward  Denison's  study,  Why  Growth  Rates  Differ.'  In his last chapter  Deni- 
son emphasizes  the catching-up  process  that helps to explain  the faster 
growth  rate in most other  industrial  countries  compared  with the United 
States.  These trends also apply to American  exports  of manufactures.  I 
would  add that the catching-up  of other  countries  in productivity  has not 
been  matched  by a fully comparable  process  on the wage side. The differ- 
ence  is clearest  in the case of Japan. 
Lawrence  Krause:  Branson  and  Junz  argue  that, if trade  positions  change 
over time, the shifts point toward  the need for changing  exchange  rates. 
But,  in fact,  the balance  of trade  is only one element  of the balance  of pay- 
ments,  and  no reasonable  man-not  even  a reasonable  government  official 
-should  have  a target  for a particular  trade  surplus.  Trade  balances  should 
be expected  to change.  The strange  fact  is the fixity  of these  balances  in the 
prewar  period,  rather  than their  variability  in the postwar  period. 
I would like to underline  the authors'  own warnings  that, in the com- 
parison  of the United  States  with  other  countries,  no one  should  expect  that 
it will be or should be exactly  like other countries.  One is nonetheless 
tempted  because  the authors  focus on differences  as though  they need ex- 
plaining  or as though  they  help  provide  an explanation  for what  happened 
to the overall  balance.  The differences  are  presented  unfortunately  in some 
normative  sense. 
Finally,  the authors'  own  presentation  and analysis  do not point  to any- 
thing  "bad"  that requires  correction  in the trade  balance.  I find  it puzzling 
to see a policy conclusion  that favors expenditures  on research  and de- 
velopment. 
William  Branson:  I agree  with Krause  that no policy recommendations 
can be made  as a result  of the study.  It was aimed  purely  at informing  our- 
selves  and our readers  about  what  has happened  to U.S. trade.  Surely,  we 
1. Edward  F. Denison, assisted by Jean-Pierre  Poullier, Why  Growth  Rates Differ: 
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cannot  say whether  the trade  surplus  should  be increased,  but if a policy 
decision  is made  to increase  it for whatever  reason,  we can say something 
about  how that might  be done. 
In response  to Aaron Gordon, a time dimension  certainly  should be 
added  to the analysis  in the latter  part  of the paper.  This paper  reports  an 
initial  set of impressions  based  on a first  inspection  of data-largely data 
assembled  by other  researchers.  I certainly  agree  that  the next  step should 
be a collection  of cross-section  data  through  the 1960s,  or at least for the 
census  years,  to permit  a more detailed  investigation. 
Helen  Junz: R. A. Gordon  noted our emphasis  on the decline  in the agri- 
cultural  trade  balance,  which  was a smaller  deterioration  than the change 
in the consumer  goods  balance.  I believe  that  this  relative  stress  is appropri- 
ate because  the shift toward  deficit,  or into larger  deficit,  in nonfood  con- 
sumer  goods is a trend  common  to all industrial  countries.  Although  the 
United States  has done a bit worse  in this area  than most other  industrial 
countries,  its performance  is not outstandingly  bad.  In my view,  this trend 
in the consumer  balance  suggests  mainly  that highly  industrialized  coun- 
tries ought not to pour resources  into, or to make large investments  in, 
industries  producing  consumer  goods for export. 
General  Discussion 
Warren  Smith questioned  whether  the analysis  supported  the policy 
conclusion  that,  to increase  the trade  surplus,  heavier  investment  in human 
capital  produced  more  results  than  the investment  tax credit  on machinery. 
The former  did seem  more  important  for increasing  exports,  but the latter 
might  be as effective  on the net balance  by strengthening  domestic  indus- 
tries that compete  with imports.  He expressed  his personal  opposition  to 
resumption  of the investment  tax credit,  and  his preference  for investment 
in human  capital,  but the consequences  for the trade  balance  had no rel- 
evance  to that choice. 
Smith  suspected  that the authors  were  showing  a tendency  (common  to 
many experts  on trade)  to endorse  anything  that increases  the volume  of 
trade. Since  the world is marked  by barriers  to trade,  there  is a case for 
stimulating  exports  rather  than restraining  imports,  when  the objective  is 
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restrictions,  there  would be no argument  whatsoever  for preferring  mea- 
sures  to expand  exports  over measures  to contract  imports.  Either  would 
distort  trade  patterns  from  their  optimum. 
Lawrence  Klein  said  that  the investment  tax credit  proposal  had so many 
dimensions  and so many  effects  that it was really  quite  irrelevant  to tie it 
to international  trade  considerations.  He supported  the authors'  position 
in focusing  on the trade  surplus  and on export  stimulation  in their com- 
ments  on policy  issues.  Even  though  Krause  was right  that  what  matters  is 
the overall  balance of payments  and not simply  the balance  on goods, 
Klein  found  it hard  to imagine  an appropriate  adjustment  of the U.S. bal- 
ance of payments  unless the trade balance  improves.  Concentrating  on 
export  stimulation  rather  than  import  restriction  makes  sense  in the  present 
context,  despite  Warren  Smith's  reservations.  Holding  down imports  en- 
tails a negative  restriction  policy,  while  promoting  exports  can be positive 
and liberalizing,  Klein concluded. 
In further  discussion  of the policy implications,  Joseph Pechman  ex- 
pressed  strong reservations  about the wisdom of any tax credit for re- 
search  and  development  expenditures.  Arthur  Okun  felt  that  the huge  U.S. 
trade  surplus  on capital  goods argued  strongly  against  a "buy  American" 
provision  in the proposed  investment  tax credit;  if other  countries  followed 
such a precedent  in their investment  incentives,  the United States  would 
have  to be a loser. 
Robert  Hall was puzzled  by the conceptual  distinction  in the paper  be- 
tween something  called "competitive  position," on the one hand, and 
relative  prices,  as influenced  by inflation  and exchange  rates,  on the other. 
He understood  the authors'  desire  to discuss  structural  changes  affecting 
U.S. comparative  advantage  in different  categories  of goods, as distinct 
from  relative  prices.  But  he wondered  whether  the framework  incorporated 
adequately  the role of price  effects. 
R. J. Gordon also wondered  how and to what extent relative  prices 
played a role in the changing  patterns  of trade. He cited a comparative 
study  of unit labor  costs recently  published  in the Monthly  Labor  Review, 
which showed  that certain  countries-Germany,  for example-gained in 
world  trade  in comparison  with the United States,  even  though  their  unit 
labor costs rose more rapidly.  British  exports continued  to drop, even 
though  the prices  or unit labor costs of Britain's  main competitors  were 
rising  as fast as their  own. There  is a real  puzzle  about  the effects  of differ- 
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David Fand wondered  whether  the loss of comparative  advantage  by 
some U.S. industries  might  be accounted  for in part by increased  indus- 
trial  concentration  or by increased  union  power  that limits  their  effective- 
ness in world markets.  He was also struck  by the sizable  discontinuities 
that appear  when the categories  are classified  by comparative  advantage. 
Changes  over time seem to intensify  the net surpluses  or net deficits  of 
various  sectors,  but do not shift them from one side of the ledger  to the 
other. He asked whether  that was surprising  or whether  it was a conse- 
quence  of the OBE  classification. 
Helen  Junz  responded  that she doubted  it was a matter  of how the data 
were  sliced.  In the SITC  data,  which  are  essentially  commodity  or product 
type classifications,  the same  sort of thing  is evident.  She agreed  that rela- 
tive price  movements  among  countries  and  across  commodities  would  lead 
one to expect  that various  goods ought to move from surplus  to deficit 
categories  and vice versa.  But that is not what  the data  reveal. 
Klein  was concerned  that  the cross-section  analysis  of U.S. comparative 
advantage  looked at American  technology  alone. Unless overseas  tech- 
nology  is considered  at the same  time,  much  ambiguity  remains  about  what 
really  moves  net exports. 
R. J. Gordon  made a point related  to Klein's.  Any projection  of com- 
parative  advantage  in various  sectors  must consider  developments  both 
here and abroad. The United States cannot count on maintaining  or 
strengthening  its comparative  advantage  in those industries  where  it has 
heavy  investment  of human  capital  unless  it can be sure  to stay ahead  of 
such investment  by other countries.  Human  capital  seems to be gaining 
rapidly  in some  industries  in Germany  and  in Japan.  It would  be interesting 
to compare  shares  of exports  of major  countries  with  ratios  of human  cap- 
ital in different  industries,  to see whether  that comparison  improved  the 
explanation. 
Charles  Schultze  suggested  that,  given  the strongly  positive  simple  corre- 
lation  between  human  and  physical  capital,  the key  to the differences  in the 
multiple regression  must be industries  that combined  low intensity of 
physical capital with high intensity of human capital. Identifying  and 
analyzing  that group  of industries  might  give some insight  into the forces 
that are actually  at work. 
Several  participants  were  concerned  that  the dependent  variable  was not 
scaled  in the regression  analysis  of the sources  of comparative  advantage. 
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taken  largely  as dollars  per man,  big industries  received  undue  weight  and 
spurious  correlations  with  the size  of industry  might  be introduced.  A num- 
ber of suggestions  were offered:  to scale  the independent  variables  by the 
size of the industry;  to use as the dependent  variable  net exports  per man, 
the ratio of exports  to imports,  the ratio of exports  to the sum of exports 
and imports,  or the ratio of net exports  to total output. 
Branson  agreed  that some  scaling  was desirable  but noted  that he lacked 
comparable  data  on total output  or employment  to implement  some  of the 
suggestions.  He felt that relationships  might  be blurred  but would  not be 
biased by his procedure.  He reiterated  that the regression  coefficients 
should  not be interpreted  as structural  partial  derivatives.  Equation  9-6 (in 
Table  9) reflects  additional  work  Branson  did  in response  to this  discussion. 
Franco  Modigliani,  however,  offered  an illustration  of how results  might 
become  biased  and distorted  by the absence  of scaling.  If young  industries 
tend to be small  industries,  the variable  on the initial  date of trade  would 
become  a negative  proxy  for industry  size and an adverse  bias against  that 
variable  would  mar  the regression  analysis.  However,  Branson  pointed  out 
that new products  are not necessarily  associated  with young industries- 
the chemical  industry  is continuously  producing  new products,  for exam- 
ple-so  that a negative  relationship  between  industry  size and the first- 
trade-date  variable  is not necessarily  implied. 